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The privatization movement is on the verge of succeeding too well.
The fact that some of what government does can be done better and
cheaper by the private sector has gained such momentum that the
public sector is sometimes seen as redundant or irrelevant. But the
economist's make-or-buy choice simply fails to capture the full
range of responsibilities that government faces in deciding whether
to outsource a particular function to private contractors.
This Article illuminates the public dimension of government
functions. By exploring the public-private distinction and relating it
to constitutional, statutory, and administrative requirements, it
structures an argument that identifies and insulates inherent
functions of government from the outsourcing calculation. The
idea that some jobs in government are better performed by the
private sector is accepted; but for other assignments, where
policymaking is at stake, the public actor is not fungible or
replaceable. The public interest, an elusive concept admittedly, has
an inevitable role to play in our political system. The elusive
concept can sometimes best be identified in emblematic ways,
through the presence of a badge or the taking of an oath.
* Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University. Thanks are due to
the participants in the February 2005 Cardozo Law School/Michigan Law School
Conference on Contracting Out at the National Academy of Public Administration and
the March 2005 Harvard Law School Conference on Government by Design for their
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For those less concerned about the historical background of the
public-private distinction and its influence on the privatization
debate, Parts I and II can be skimmed. Discussing the practical
dimensions of privatization starts with Part IlL Parts IV and V
offer a variety of legal and policy prescriptions. The Article
concludes by observing that all three branches of government must
help keep privatization within democratic bounds.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship of government to the private sector is very
much in flux these days. Pressures are building to outsource more
and more government functions. At the same time, the federal
civilian bureaucracy is shrinking in alarming proportion to its
oversight responsibilities.' The number of private contractors doing
the work of government has accelerated, while the number of federal
employees needed to supervise them has eroded.2 This imbalance has
negative consequences for public management generally, but it
specifically makes surveillance of privatized activities an urgent
matter.3 When combined with the loss of key government personnel,
this lack of oversight and control becomes an inevitable consequence
of privatization, producing imbalance between those in government
1. There are currently fewer than 1.9 million civilian employees of the federal
government (excluding the post office). In 1990 there were over 2.25 million. At the
Department of Defense (the "DOD"), civilian employment was virtually cut in half during
the 1990 to 2003 period. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE
STATISTICS: THE FACT BOOK 8-9 (2004) [hereinafter THE FACT BOOK], available at
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/ factbook/2004/factbook.pdf. Of course not all employees are
equally important, but the downsizing trend is also reflected in the Senior Executive
Service, the top public managers. See infra note 378.
2. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 1 (1999) (stating that the
"'shadow of government' . . . consisted of 12.7 million full-time-equivalent jobs" in 1996).
The ratio of private contractors to public employees is now over 6 to 1, but the more
significant deficit is in the reduction of top level government officials, such as contracting
officers and the Senior Executive Service, who have seen their numbers drop as their
contracting oversight responsibilities have grown. See infra note 378.
3. The Government Accountability Office, for example, has reported that DOD
oversight was insufficient in about one-third of its contracts, a deficiency it attributes at
least partially to declining personnel levels. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-274, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE
SURVEILLANCE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SERVICE CONTRACTS 2-3 (2005)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT ON IMPROVING SURVEILLANCE], available at
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-274.
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who should oversee and those in the private sector who are meant to
be overseen.
This accountability4 gap is really a byproduct of two converging
forces: the deregulation movement, which renders many government
regulatory programs unnecessary, and the privatization movement,
which transfers government activities to the private sector.
Deregulation critiques the economic role of government over the
economy. It seeks to end programs that are inefficient or
counterproductive.5 Privatization plays a different role. It accepts the
need for a government activity, but sees efficiency advantages in
shifting it to private hands. In the United States, at least,6
privatization, unlike deregulation, is concerned less with the amount
of government expenditures than with where to place responsibility
for the activity.7 The size of government, viewed as a percentage of
the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"), could well grow in a privatized
environment, as it has during the Bush administration.'
Proponents of privatization and deregulation share a belief that
the market will improve the services provided by a monopolistic
bureaucracy. Privatization was a cornerstone of the reinventing
government movement during the Clinton-Gore administration.' It
has thrived during the Bush administration. President Bush's vision
4. A useful definition of accountability in the bureaucratic setting is provided by
Professor Rubin: "[A]ccountability refers to the ability of one actor to demand an
explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that
second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation." Edward Rubin, The Myth
of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2119
(2005) (arguing for the accountability advantages of the administrative state).
5. For example, consider airline regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Of
course, not all deregulatory actions involve program termination, and "reregulation" often
follows deregulation. See JEFFREY HARRISON, THOMAS D. MORGAN, & PAUL R.
VERKUIL, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 16-19 (2d ed. 2004); see also ALFRED C.
AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT 93-96 (2004) (describing various kinds of
legislative delegation to the market).
6. Privatization in European countries has a broader connotation-the
denationalization of government programs. By transferring assets to the private sector
(airlines, television stations, and public utilities are good examples) some nations can
reduce the size of the public sector. See generally Alessandro Petretto, The Liberalization
and Privatization of Public Utilities and the Protection of Users' Rights: The Perspective of
Economic Theory, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW: PUBLIC
AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES 99, 99-106 (Mark Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds.,
1998) [hereinafter PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW] (describing
public utility deregulation).
7. See infra text accompanying note 120.
8. See discussion infra note 333.
9. See discussion infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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of an "ownership society,"10 which advocates private accounts as an
alternative to Social Security, further highlights the private sector's
role in the provision of traditional government services. Privatization
is a presumed good in this setting. And the reality is that our
government could not function without contracting out some of its
services. Privatization has been part of government management
since the post World War I period," but its acceleration to the limits
of accountability is a relatively recent phenomenon. Today, the
degree and level of those delegations has become a central issue of
public policy.
In addition, stating a preference for private over public solutions,
as the "ownership society" suggests, can have unintended
consequences. By endorsing the view that private enterprise provides
a superior organizing principle to government monopoly,
privatization forces the public sector to defend itself. Thus, the
central question of the privatization movement is whether the term
"public sector" continues to be a viable social concept. Stated
alternatively, is the public-private distinction, which has demarked
law and political theory from the earliest times, still meaningful in an
era of transcendent privatization?
This Article explores the relationship of public law to
privatization. 2 It elaborates upon the public-private distinction and
asks whether the values of responsibility and accountability behind
the distinction still serve to limit the privatization movement.
Accepting privatization, it is argued, need not mean the end of public
law; indeed, public law limitations must be satisfied before some
government functions can be outsourced.
The contracting out process, which broadly describes how the
government transfers programs to the private sector, is configured
next. Longstanding practice assumes that the contracting out of
"inherent government functions" is not permitted. But the pro-
10. See David E. Rosenbaum, Bush to Return to 'Ownership Society' Theme in Push
for Social Security Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at A20.
11. See Dan Guttman, Inherently Government Functions and the New Millennium:
The Legacy of Twentieth-Century Reform, in MAKING GOVERNMENT MANAGEABLE:
EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 40,
40-46 (Thomas H. Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg eds., 2004).
12. In doing so, it does not challenge creative attempts to involve the private sector in
the. regulatory process. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3-4 (1992) (proposing
participation by the private sector in shaping regulations); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342, 376-79 (2004) (describing how regulated parties should be able to help
shape the regulation that controls them).
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privatization environment erodes whatever limits that phrase implies.
One purpose of this Article is to insist that inherent government
functions must be preserved in the process of contracting out. Here
the application of both constitutional and statutory requirements, in
particular the Take Care Clause and the Subdelegation Act, frame
the analysis. Do these provisions serve not only as grants of power to
the executive branch, but also as limits on the exercise of these
powers? Administrative practice under the Office of Management
and Budget's ("OMB's") Circular A-76 is explored in order to help
define the limits of the contracting out process. After understanding
the realities of current practice, improvements are suggested in the
way that contracting out is usually conducted by agencies and OMB.
The goal is to balance the two positives of the private and public
sectors-efficiency and accountability-in ways that confirm rather
than threaten our legal and political traditions. Accountability for
private delegations emerges from legal standards already in place as
well as from new formulations that embrace an invigorated
conception of the public sector.
I. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION: HISTORICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
For anyone who has studied the administrative state here and
abroad, the most complicated question is understanding where the
line between public and private is drawn. Often the effort is
abandoned as unproductive. Yet when confronted with the
phenomenon of "privatization," the question becomes irresistible;
one is compelled to discover whether a line (or some approximation
of it) can be drawn. Identifying the continuing role for the state in
the context of privatization implicates the public-private distinction
and its connection to democratic political theory.
A. An Overview of the Public-Private Distinction
The words "public" and "private" are so commonplace in
American law and society that they almost defy definition. In society
generally, these words are politically charged. To take but one
example, they have been invoked to separate public discourse from
private conversation in an effort to foster civic engagement.13
13. See Judith Rodin & Stephen P. Steinberg, Introduction: Incivility and Public
Discourse, in PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN AMERICA 1, 7-11 (Judith Rodin & Stephen P.
Steinberg eds., 2003). See generally JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY
AND POLITICAL THEORY (1992) (describing civil society).
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Inevitably, the line between them remains ambiguous and contested.
In fact, Neil Smelser has noted that "the private-public distinction
constitutes a political strategy in and of itself."14  One makes a
political choice by using the distinction to defend or attack the public
order. As Michael Taggart perceives, "the public/private divide ...
has its roots in liberalism."" Liberalism not only underpins our social
order: it ultimately derives its force from the Constitution.
Calling an activity "public" has served to legitimate
governmental action since society was formed. Indeed, from the time
of Justinian,16 "public law" and "private law" have defined the
relationship of the individual to the state. In Continental
jurisprudence, which traces its roots to Roman law, public law carries
with it substantive obligations of the state to the citizen.17 In the
Anglo-American legal tradition, 8 public law has similar, but less well
articulated connotations.
Still, expressions of the "public interest" are often used to justify
the role of government in our liberal democratic state. For example,
since the nineteenth century, agencies have been empowered to
protect the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."' 9 But that
14. Neil Smelser, A Paradox of Public Discourse and Political Democracy, in PUBLIC
DISCOURSE IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 178, 179.
15. Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 4 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
16. Justinian's Digests read as follows: "There are two branches of legal study: public
and private law. Public law is that which respects the establishment of the Roman
commonwealth, private that which respects individuals' interests, some matters being of
public and others of private interest." DIG. 1.1.1.2 (Ulpian, Institutes 1) (1 THE DIGEST
OF JUSTINIAN § 1 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., University of Pennsylvania Press 1985)).
17. See generally David Faulkner, Public Services, Citizenship and the State-the
British Experience 1967-97, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW,
supra note 6, at 35, 36-37 (discussing how civil law tradition connected the public interest
to public law); Mark Freedland, Law, Public Services, and Citizenship-New Domains,
New Regimes?, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW, supra 6, at 1,
33-34 (same); Carol Harlow, Public Service, Market Ideology, and Citizenship, in PUBLIC
SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 6, at 49, 53-54 (same).
18. Public law in common law America and England is far less well developed than in
civil law Europe. However, various public law doctrines have been incorporated in our
system of administrative law. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL
R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2004). See generally
ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW (2003) (describing the development of English public law).
19. See Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301,340-41 (1989) (connecting the public interest
to the rule of law); Paul R. Verkuil, Understanding the "Public Interest" Justification for
Government Actions, 39 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 141, 142 (1998) [hereinafter
Verkuil, Understanding Public Interest] (describing various formulations of the public
interest and seeking to define it in rule of law terms) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 67 (3d ed. 1994)).
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phrase is offensively self-fulfilling in a liberal society where the
presumption is in favor of private interests. Classical liberals believe
with Adam Smith that the exercise of self (private) interest is the best
way to represent the public interest, ° guaranteeing controversy when
the assertion of an independent public interest is made. The broad
public interest justifications acceptable to the New Deal, for example,
were constantly challenged during the Reagan presidency.21 The
Reagan spirit animates the current Administration as well. The focus
on an ownership society is meant to undermine the underlying values
of the New Deal itself.22 The privatization movement also challenges
expansive notions of the public interest. But this debate is hard to
conclude.
As the definition in Justinian's Digests suggests23 and history
demonstrates, the line between public and private regularly shifts
over time.24 Private law traditionally encompassed the common law
of contract, torts, and property that regulate relations among
individuals.2 5 But the term "private" is hardly any more self-evident
(or any less self-fulfilling) than the term "public." Since law and its
enforcement are public acts, all legal regimes, even if ostensibly
private at common law, are in some sense public.26 Additionally,
otherwise private relations are often umpired and regulated by
20. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not To Like About Being a
Lawyer?, 109 YALE L.J. 1443, 1479 (2000) (arguing that private sector lawyers, by
pursuing their self-interest, make an "enormous economic contribution to social welfare").
21. See Paul R. Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties,
45 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1993) (describing how Reaganomics brought the New Deal to a
halt).
22. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Fighting Moderates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at
A19 ("lit takes an act of willful blindness not to see that the Bush plan for Social Security
is intended, in essence, to dismantle the most important achievement of the New Deal.").
23. See DIG. 1.1.1.2-4 (Ulpian, Institutes 1) (1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note
16, § 1) (noting that some matters of private law can be of public interest and dividing
private law into a tripartite structure, including natural law, the law of nations, and civil
law).
24. Indeed, even in France, which has always embraced the public-private distinction
in its legal system, the dividing line between the ordinary and administrative courts has to
be adjudicated by the Tribunal des Conflits. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL,
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 144-45 (4th ed. 1993).
25. For a good discussion of the public-private distinction as it relates to English
common and public law, see MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 6, 77-80
(2003).
26. Since much of the common law has become statutory, one can view the work of
legislatures in this regard as the publicization of private law. For example, contracts are
only enforceable through public acts. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
230-32 (1960).
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government.27 In our society, the Constitution continuously expands
or contracts the private category through definitions of property or
privacy. Each time it does, the role of government is expanded or
inhibited accordingly.28 To the extent that America is characterized
as a "deliberative democracy, "29 we can always expect the legal
definition of private and public to ebb and flow based on the
preferences of interest groups, political parties, and the views of the
judiciary.
When government delegates public powers to private hands, as
when it "privatizes" regulatory activity, the impact on the public
interest is hard to measure.30 To some degree, making public actions
"private" validates the close connection between these two concepts.
On the other hand, the potential transfer of power to private hands
raises procedural as well as substantive questions: do public law
controls, such as oversight and accountability, come with the
delegations; should private parties be able to wield public power?
These rule of law based considerations help establish a dividing line
between public and private. That line is fundamental-it ultimately
distinguishes liberal society from its despotic alternatives.3' Fairness
in procedures, indeed legalism itself, is how the liberal state is
defined. Viewed in philosophical terms, through the work of Stuart
Hampshire for example, process is not only a basic condition of the
27. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2000) (displacing "private" tort remedies with government regulatory programs).
28. For example, the First Amendment in separating church and state ensures a
"private sector" for religion. And the Due Process Clause can also cover even larger
notions of privacy. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 578-79 (2003) (holding that
consensual and private sex acts may not be reached by sodomy laws); cf. Katherine M.
Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1401-
04 (2004) (asserting that the case announces a "privatized liberty right").
29. See David M. Ryfe, Deliberative Democracy and Public Discourse, in PUBLIC
DISCOURSE IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 40, 42-45 (comparing deliberative democracy
to individual rights and social choice theories and noting that many Americans prefer
"political privatization"). See generally RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (2003) (expressing generally critical views of deliberative democracy).
30. The question of privatization becomes the political one of how far "the
individualization of judgments about what constitutes public value" can or should go in
our society. See Mark H. Moore, Introduction to Symposium, Public Values in an Era of
Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (2003) (discussing the left-right politics of the
privatization debate).
31. The dividing line between democracy and fascism has been said to consist of some
limits upon the merger of the public and private sectors. See ROBERT 0. PAXTON, THE
ANATOMY OF FASCISM 11 (2004) (stating that in fascism, "an individual had no rights
outside [the] community interest").
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liberal state, but of human nature itself.32 Delegations of government
authority to private hands in our society are not simple transfer
decisions. They come with strings attached that ensure fairness at the
individual level and accountability at the political level. In this way,
the debate about public versus private becomes a meditation on our
constitutional values.
B. Constitutional Connections to the Public-Private Distinction
The public-private distinction underpins our common law and
constitutional traditions. These traditions in turn help set limits on
the impulse to privatize. But before reaching that point, the
constitutional roots of the distinction are worth remembering.
The public-private distinction was central to the natural rights
liberalism of John Locke,33 who transmitted the values of the
Glorious Revolution to the Constitution's drafters.34 Locke saw the
emergence of separate realms of public and private as essential
conditions of the liberal democratic state.35 To some extent, Locke
32. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE AS CONFLICT 4 (2000). Stuart Hampshire makes a
powerful case for "adversarial thinking" as a constraint on human nature. See id. at 12. In
the privatization setting, the issue becomes whether procedures will be transferred along
with delegated duties. See discussion infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
33. Social contract theorists from John Locke to John Rawls have understood the role
of government in civil society to be a limited and consensual one. For Locke, the purpose
of government (commonwealth) was the preservation of both private property and the
civil society. But he talks about the need for the ruler to act for the "public good." JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 124-25 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952)
(1690); see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17 (1971). One difference between
Locke and Rawls, however, is that Locke accepts that there is a "public body" that has a
right to preserve itself, whereas Rawls's liberalism rejects the notion of political society as
a community. See PETER JOSEPHSON, THE GREAT ART OF GOVERNMENT-LOCKE'S
USE OF CONSENT 11-12 (2002).
34. See DAVID S. LOVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 235-70
(1972) (describing how the colonies responded to the 1688 Glorious Revolution in
England). Locke's influence on the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence is
well established. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 14 (1969) (showing how American colonists "borrowed promiscuously"
from John Locke, among others); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420-21
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting John Locke on nondelegation of legislative powers).
See generally HAYEK, supra note 26, at 169-71 (placing Locke at the center of the
Glorious Revolution's creation of the rule of law).
35. Underpinning Locke in this regard was Benedict de Spinoza, who perceived the
need to create a public-private dichotomy from the prospective of a religious minority.
See STEVEN NADLER, SPINOZA'S HERESY 19-22 (2001). The motivation for Spinoza's
political philosophy was the "theologico-political problem," the resolution of which
required the separation of church and state. STEVEN B. SMITH, SPINOZA, LIBERALISM,
AND THE QUESTION OF JEWISH IDENTITY 1-27 (1997); Steven B. Smith, On Leo Strauss's
Critique of Spinoza, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 741, 751-52 (2003).
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and his followers36 (including our constitutional drafters) made liberal
democracy a theory about what can be made public. The
Constitution employs the words "public" and "private" in ways that
acknowledge the historical distinction between them.37 And by
placing sovereignty in the people, both liberal theory and the
Constitution make the political sovereign the source of delegated, not
inherent, powers. The powers not thereby granted remain as private
rights.3" Public law must justify itself in these terms. It does so
through the law of the Constitution and, by extension, of the
administrative state which undergirds it.39 By pursuing expressions of
public and private contained in our Constitution, the connections
between these words emerge.
1. The Fifth Amendment's "Public Use" Requirement
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment" both
guarantees the existence of private property and limits the extent to
which government may commandeer (or "publicize") it. The "public
use" requirement expresses the constitutional limits implicit in the
public-private distinction. By second guessing what can be made
public and protecting something private, the clause mediates the
boundaries between the two concepts. Interpreting this clause is one
36. See generally WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, THE LIMITS OF STATE ACTION (1852)
(J.W. Burrow ed., 1969). Von Humboldt's classic work, which inspired John Stuart Mill's
On Liberty, focused on the need to restrain government activity as a means of preserving
individual freedom.
37. The Constitution uses the word "public" in several ways: "public money," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; "public acts," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; "public danger," U.S.
CONST. amend. V; "public debt," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. While the word "private"
is not attached to "property" in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, its presence is to be assumed. U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV. The phrase
"private property" is used in the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. It should be noted that the word "property" may not mean the same
thing in these different constitutional contexts. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 893, 954-56 (2000); see also E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 557 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Property] appears in the midst of
different phrases with somewhat different objectives, thereby permitting differences in the
way in which the term is interpreted.").
38. This is the purpose of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments which speak of rights
"retained by" or "reserved to" the people. See U.S. CONST. amends. IX & X; RANDY E.
BARNET-r, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 354-57 (2004) (rejecting the social
contract theory but urging protection of liberty through application of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments).
39. See generally A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 179-201, 324-401 (8th ed. 1915) (providing the classical description of the
role and limits of constitutional law and administrative law in England).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
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of the best ways to define the public-private distinction in
constitutional terms.
Despite this conceptual purpose, however, the "public use"
doctrine has not often been used in an authoritative way.4' The
Supreme Court has usually left the interpretation of public use to
state courts, which do not move in consistent directions.42 In a recent
example, the Michigan Supreme Court in County of Wayne v.
Hathcock43 articulated public use limits upon the transfer of private
property to private rather than public hands.44 Hathcock's limitations
upon public use seemed both to preserve the public-private
distinction and to support a process based limitation upon the
privatizing of public functions.a On the other hand, the Connecticut
Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New London,46 in permitting
transfers of public property to private developers for economic
development purposes,47 glossed over the public-private distinction.
As Stuart Sterk argues, the only consistent thing one can say about
the public use cases is that the Supreme Court honors the underlying
federalism values behind state court interpretations. 48 However, the
"consistency" of the federalism approach to public use has itself been
challenged.
The Supreme Court affirmed Kelo in a 5-4 decision, but the pro-
federalism Justices were counted in the minority. They sought to
41. The Court has left it largely to Congress or state legislatures to decide what is a
public use. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-43 (1984) (state);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (federal). See generally, Errol E. Meidinger,
The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 1 (1980)
(discussing shifting definitions of public use).
42. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004) (holding economic
development by private entities an acceptable public use under federal and state
constitutions over strong dissents), affd., 125 S. Ct. 2655 (5-4) (2005); County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 788 (Mich. 2004) (holding condemnation for a business park
fails the public use test).
43. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
44. See id. at 786-87 (overruling an earlier decision, Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981)).
45. The Hathcock court limited the condemnation of private property for transfer to
private hands under the public use doctrine to situations where there was: (1) public
necessity; (2) public oversight; and (3) a public concern. See id. at 781-83. These
limitations give meaning to a concept of public use that respects public control and limits
and also accountability (oversight).
46. 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd., 125 S. Ct. 2655 (5-4) (2005); see discussion
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 561-62.
48. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 222-26 (2004) (explaining the confused results in
takings cases as an (overlooked) function of federalism).
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restore a public-private line and balked at further diluting the idea of
"public use."49  Justice Stevens' majority opinion, reflecting the
Court's dominant view, equated public use with "public purpose" and
approved the use of eminent domain proceedings for economic
development purposes.50  But Justice O'Connor's biting dissent
sought to infuse "public use" with constitutional content.5 Accusing
the majority of trying "to wash out any distinction between private
and public use of property," she refused to defer to state legislative
judgments or to equate public use with the broad exercise of police
power.5 2 For Justice Thomas, also in dissent, the limitations upon
public use were even clearer; he found that the Constitution
elsewhere defined "use" in the narrow sense of government
ownership or control. 3 These dissents may signal a revival of classical
property law limitations upon public use.54  They surely help
resuscitate the public-private distinction elucidated here.
Indeed, the public use requirements of the Just Compensation
Clause, if so revived, connect directly to the Lockean concept of
limited government discussed above. The renewed vigor with which
the dissenters in Kelo supported a fixed meaning of public use makes
these historical sources all the more relevant. But employing them to
frame a coherent idea of public use may not yield any more
consistency than the current federalism-based approach. As with the
"affected with a public interest" category discussed in the next
Section, the application of principle to specific facts inevitably
produces indeterminacy.
49. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
50. Id. at 2667 (rejecting a bright line rule against transfers of private property to
private developers and rejecting "empirical debates over the wisdom of takings").
51. Justice O'Connor identified three categories of takings: transfers of private
property to public ownership (e.g., for roads); transfers to common carriers (e.g., railroad
rights of way); and limited transfers to satisfy public purposes. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). While Kelo involved the third category, with its still unresolved dimensions,
the second category reflects the "affected with a public interest" test discussed in the next
section.
52. Id. at 2671 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2678-79. Justice Thomas also refers to the common law background of the
Constitution as reinforcing a narrower (Blackstone-inspired) definition of public use. Id.
at 2677.
54. See Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at
A14 (calling the majority opinion "a new low point in the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence").
55. See discussion supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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2. The Rise and Fall of "Affected with a Public Interest"
The public-private distinction is often equated with the
nineteenth century rise of capitalism. Public charters, which had
earlier been granted by government to provide protection for
established monopolies, were challenged by new enterprises eager to
enter those restricted markets.56 Legislatures distinguished private
corporations from public ones, and the Supreme Court guaranteed
Contracts Clause protection for new enterprises. 7 The corporate
identity itself-through the expanded concept of limited liability-
helped make capital formation easier and more accessible. As
Richard Epstein explains, incorporation conferred "upon
corporations and their shareholders a privilege against the rest of the
world that they could not obtain under the usual rules of property,
contract, and tort."58  In this way, public law became an early
instrument in the expansion of private enterprise.
But public law also constrained this expanded private power.
The concept of businesses "affected with a public interest" granted
states regulatory control over private monopolies. In Munn v.
Illinois,59 the Court traced the "affected with a public interest"
concept back to English common law,6" under which "common
carriers" with monopoly power were controlled from the earliest
times.6" However, this connection was often attenuated, and tying the
fate of common carriers to the shifting sands of monopoly power did
56. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 549-52 (1837) (holding
that the Contract Clause cannot be used to protect existing state-chartered bridges from
new competition); see also Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition
in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 138-42 (1985) (discussing
abuses of the special charter system).
57. See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 707-12
(1819) (explaining that the State cannot abrogate a grant to a private corporation by
public action of reincorporation); RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 107
(1993) (emphasizing importance of limited liability to the growth of the economy).
58. EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 107.
59. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
60. Id. at 123-25; see also LOUGHLIN, supra note 25, at 77-80 (describing the
emergence of the public-private distinction in English law).
61. The common law had always subjected "common carriers" to absolute liability
when they exercised their economic powers to raise prices and restrict output. Hackmen,
ferrymen, wharfmen, innkeepers, and the like had economic control over commerce that
rendered them common rather than private carriers. See generally SIR MATTHEW HALE,
THE HISTORY OF COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (C.M. Gray ed., 1971) (providing a
general history of English law). The category of common carriers was loosely tied to the
exercise of monopoly power.
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62not always make economic sense. But even after Munn, the
"affected with a public interest" concept maintained its vitality.
Once substantive control of enterprise was established, the focus
shifted to the regulatory overseers, the bureaucracy itself. The
"spoils" system of government, emblematic of the administrations of
Presidents Jackson and Grant,63 came under attack for undermining
the effectiveness of the regulatory process. To regulate in the public
interest government had to confront the need to bring integrity, if not
competency and efficiency, into the public service.' Civil service
reform helped reshape the political process into a public interest
61regime. In fostering oversight and accountability through
professional management, government tried to remove process
deficiencies from the existing regulatory model.66 By subjecting the
administrative process to the rule of law, regulations became a more
rational exercise.
The "affected with a public interest" theory of regulation, the
formation of the civil service, 67 and the rule of law are all related.
Professional administration coupled with legal process defined public
interest by adding fairness, transparency, and accountability to
regulation. This idealized version of the beginnings of public
management contains a necessary truth: without the connection to
the rule of law, the definitional vagueness of the "affected with a
public interest" concept would be unacceptable. The rule of law
62. Oliver W. Holmes questioned whether there should be special liability rules for all
common carriers, but reserved some room for special cases, such as railroads, which
clearly possessed monopoly power. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 155-62
(1881) (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1963). The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 37-38 (1883)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), focused on the public use aspects of Munn to justify federal
antidiscrimination legislation held unconstitutional in that case. See Paul R. Verkuil,
Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 669, 670-71 (2005).
63. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 45-47 (1953)
(describing President Jackson's doctrine of "rotation in office," also known as the spoils
system).
64. See Civil Service (Pendleton) Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat 403.
65. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 1830-
1900, at 119-25 (1982) (providing a thorough analysis of the civil service reform period of
the late nineteenth century).
66. In England, the notion of civil service predated our own. See DICEY, supra note
39, at 384-87 (describing servants of the Crown and distinguishing the English Civil
Service under the rule of law from the French droit adminitratif).
67. Professor Nelson attributes the creation of the term "civil service" to British
reformers. See NELSON, supra note 65, at 119. The connection of "civil service" to "civil
society," mentioned earlier, see discussion supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text, is
also of significance.
2006]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
forces some degree of rationality upon the regulatory process,68 and
the presence of a professional civil service removes some degree of
politics from the outcome. In our pluralistic society where agreement
on ends is never assured, justice as process at least provides
agreements in means. For Stuart Hampshire, who stipulates
substantive disagreements over concepts of justice in society, the
common commitment to procedural justice is what permits a just
society to emerge.69
Regulation of the abusive exercise of economic power has deep
roots. Even during the era of Lochner v. New York,7 ° when
regulation based on the conclusory notion of "public interest" was
consistently challenged, the monopoly-based theory underlying Munn
managed to survive.71 In otherwise constitutionalizing the private
interests protected by liberty of contract," Lochner traced its roots
back to the notions of liberalism inspired by Locke. Its premises were
tied to deeply felt ideas of individualism and economic liberty.73
Later, a more skeptical Court, inspired by Holmes' Lochner dissent,"
ultimately rejected these premises. Ironically, it also threw out the
monopoly-based definition of "affected with a public interest" that
had survived during the Lochner period.75 Perhaps, as Professor
68. See Verkuil, Understanding Public Interest, supra note 19, at 146-49 (explaining
the historical concept of public interest in rule of law terms).
69. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 32, at 4-5 (connecting procedural justice to adversary
reasoning); see also discussion supra note 32 and accompanying text.
70. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
71. Of course, the regulation of monopoly had been granted statutory status in the
Sherman Act after the Munn decision, which permitted direct regulation to support, if not
supplant, "affected with a public interest" regulation. See Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647,
26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)), amended by Pub. L. No.
108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004). Also, in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Commission
established rate regulation as a bureaucratic goal. See NELSON, supra note 65, at 130-33.
72. See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 374-75
(2003) (arguing that Lochner's error was in exalting liberty of contract). But see Richard
A. Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 654-55 (2004)
(challenging Strauss' views on Lochner); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Liberalism Versus
Classical Liberalism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 661 (2004) (assailing Epstein's desire to make
"freedom of contract the supreme constitutional principle").
73. See BARNETT, supra note 38, at 211-18, 222-23 (extolling the virtues of Lochner
and theorizing about its revival); see also, Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner's Loss:
Randy Barnett's Case for a Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 840-45
(2005) (critiquing the libertarian constitution).
74. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
75. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1934) (permitting state regulation
of retail milk prices and effectively undermining the monopoly-based limitation upon the
"affected with a public interest" concept). But see Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297
U.S. 266, 274 (1936) (striking down a New York milk regulation designed to freeze out
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Horwitz has argued, rejection of the monopoly based limits of public
interest was the fault of the Legal Realists, who, in debunking the
idea of a truly private sector, also undermined the notion of a truly
public sector.76 But once freed from its historical moorings, the public
interest concept became just another legal fiction, which made it fair
game for later critics of government regulation.77 Today the focus is
more on the procedural side of regulation since the public interest
rationale is less able to serve as a justifying or limiting principle.78
3. Public Functions and Process Limits
The public interest concept flourished during the New Deal,
which subjected many kinds of previously unregulated private
enterprises to government control.79 An invigorated bureaucracy
transformed government's relationship to the private sector, which
made government service a creative enterprise.80 The Roosevelt
administration acted through agencies (such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission) and made extensive use of governmental
competitors). See generally Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, in
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2006) (describing post-Nebbia
New Deal cases that preserved the monopoly distinction).
76. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public-Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423, 1426-27 (1982); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351-57 (1982) (discussing the merger
of public and private). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
873, 874-75 (1987) (reaffirming Lochner's assumption about neutrality of the common law
in the state action context).
77. See generally HARRISON, MORGAN, & VERKUIL, supra note 5, at 56-120, 250-421
(describing public choice critiques of regulation); Verkuil, Understanding Public Interest,
supra note 19, at 146-50 (discussing ways in which the public interest is still evoked
without analysis).
78. Interestingly, if Lochner's substantive due process approach was to be revived, as
Professor Barnett has suggested, see BARNETT, supra note 38, at 120-24, the public
interest could be attacked directly, and then its monopoly-based rationale might reemerge.
See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 264-66 (1980)
(comparing laissez-faire to "an active, yet principled, conception of governmental
regulation").
79. See Verkuil, Understanding Public Interest, supra note 19, at 142 (listing the
Federal Communications Commission as a New Deal agency whose mandate was to
regulate in "the public interest, convenience and necessity"); see also JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 40-41 (1938) (describing the virtues of regulatory
agencies); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 250-55 (1996) (comparing
the National Recovery Administration to other New Deal regulatory initiatives).
80. The New Deal made the bureaucracy a challenging profession precisely because
its powers could be exercised so creatively. See P.H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS
passim (1982) (documenting the career paths in government of top law school graduates);
see also DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, THE JOURNAL OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL-THE TVA
YEARS 1939-1945, 10-13, 549 (1964) (discussing author's years at Harvard Law School
and his relationship to Felix Frankfurter).
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corporations. 81  The notion of "yardstick" competition,82  with
government showing private enterprise how to compete, gave
government an entrepreneurial role in major projects like the
Tennessee Valley Authority.83  It also suggested an arrogance-
government can not only regulate better, it can compete better-that
would be short lived. In a way, the privatization movement may be
government's way of doing penance for its earlier assumption of
private roles.
After Nebbia v. New York,84 challenges to the substance of the
regulation were virtually foreclosed.85  But greater calls for
procedural regularity were increasingly heard. The expressed fear
was that administrative regulations would overwhelm the rule of law
and jeopardize the premises of the liberal democratic state.86
Conservatives, outflanked on the substance of New Deal legislation,
turned to process as a means of restricting substantive goals.87 The
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")88 emerged to accommodate
the appropriate role of process. Today the APA remains the primary
method for achieving procedural justice in the federal administrative
state. 9
The Due Process Clause was also invoked, but in its procedural,
not substantive (i.e., Lochnerian) sense. The "public function"
doctrine subjected private activities to government control. In cases
like Smith v. Allwright9° and Marsh v. Alabama91 the Supreme Court
81. See Lebron v. Nat'l. R.R. Passengers Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394 (1995) (describing
the New Deal as the "heyday of those corporations").
82. See Jeffery L. Harrison, Yardstick Competition: A Prematurely Discarded Form of
Regulatory Relief, 53 TUL. L. REV. 465, 466 (1979).
83. See generally LILIENTHAL, supra note 80 (describing the TVA experience).
84. 291 U.S. 502 (1934); see also supra note 75 (providing related public interest
cases).
85. See BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE 131-39 (1983) (describing the heights
of New Deal social legislation).
86. Roscoe Pound, as chair of the American Bar Association Committee to Create
the Administrative Procedure Act, was a most outspoken advocate of the New Deal's
penchant for "administrative absolutism." See 63 A.B.A. REP. 339-46 (1938). See
generally Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 260, 268-70 (1978) (discussing the New Deal's challenges to established notions of
the rule of law).
87. See Verkuil, supra note 86, at 270-72 (describing the battle between procedural
conservatives and regulatory liberals that led to the compromise of the Administrative
Procedure Act).
88. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
89. See generally PIERCE, SHAPIRO, & VERKUIL, supra note 18, § 2.3 (describing the
APA's role).
90. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
91. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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extended "state action" status to private entities, such as company
towns, that by their monopoly positions inevitably performed public
functions.92  Echoing Munn, these cases essentially designated
monopolistic private entities as "affected with a public interest." The
exercise of monopoly power by these private entities became, as had
the exercise of monopoly by the grain elevators in Munn, the
justification for regulation. These cases in effect overcame limits on
state action earlier declared under the Fourteenth Amendment.93 In
reconnecting due process to the exercise of private power, the Court
in the public function cases achieved public accountability and
oversight. Over time, the public function test has waned in influence.
The Court, while continuing to recognize that the test tracked the
monopoly concerns behind regulation,94 seems to have abandoned the
quest for an adequate definition of public function.95
The "public function?' and "public interest" tests suffer from the
same definitional weaknesses, so it is not surprising that the Court is
hesitant to give them legal force. But it is surely intriguing that those
members of the Court who hesitate to give these open-ended terms
legal content have in their Kelo dissents embarked on a comparable
attempt to define "public use" under the Fifth Amendment. 96
"Public function," "public interest," and "public use" share a
checkered history as legal concepts. But since they capture broad
legal and social concerns, they cannot be avoided. Thus, while
demurring on the merits of the public-private distinction, the Court is
still entangled in its various substantive manifestations. And the
92. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506 (finding that a "company" town performs public
functions and is subject to First Amendment control); Smith, 321 U.S. at 663-64 (noting
that conduct of elections is a public functions); see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469
(1953) (same); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1422-24 (2003) (describing public functions).
93. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25-26 (1883) (declaring a federal statute
that would have prevented certain private businesses from discriminating constitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Verkuil, supra note 62, at 670 (discussing how
the "Supreme Court limited the potential reach of the Due Process clause in the Civil
Rights Cases" to state action).
94. The monopoly point was raised by the Court in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 162 (1978), when it distinguished the private monopoly in Marsh from the wide
number of choices debtors and creditors have under the state self-help statute in Flagg.
Professor Metzger has also connected the state action cases to the Court's earlier concerns
with private delegations in cases like Carter Coal. See Metzger, supra note 92, at 1444
(noting this as a link the Court itself has failed to make).
95. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 348 (1974) (regulation
of private utility is not "state action" under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Verkuil, supra note 62, at 674-75 (describing the state action
pullback led by Jackson).
96. See discussion supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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distinction continues to demand process controls that reflect the rule
of law values connected to our political and legal traditions.
C. New Property and the Old Bureaucracy
The emergence of the concept of "new property" complicated
the rule of law.97 In the 1960s the administration of government
benefit programs fell under increased judicial scrutiny. The notion of
government as a neutral and benign dispenser of privileges was
systematically deconstructed. 98 The expansion of programs begun in
the New Deal ultimately tested the limits of due process based
procedures. Once subjected to rights based analysis, many processes
of government were exposed as arbitrary or even irrational. 99 Faith in
bureaucracy waned"° and the underlying public interest rationales for
regulatory programs suffered. Goldberg v. Kelly, l'O which focused on
the procedural rights of beneficiaries of welfare programs, became
the emblematic case for judicial intervention.0 z In a way, Goldberg
did to government control of public property procedurally what
Lochner had done for government control of private property
substantively. But Goldberg could no more sustain itself than
Lochner could. Its thoroughgoing commitment to the adversary
model proved unworkable, t0 3 and the Supreme Court soon limited the
97. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778-86 (1964) (declaring
rights to government benefits, privileges, and licenses to be new property no less entitled
to legal protection than traditional forms of property); see William Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439,
1451-57 (1968). As Professor Van Alstyne showed, the demise of the right-privilege
distinction meant an expansion of due process protection for certain kinds of property. Id.
The public-private distinction relates to the right-privilege distinction in the sense that it
shifted certain property interests from the private to the public side of the equation. Id.
98. This same discontent with the provision of public services occurred in England as
well. See Faulkner, supra note 17, at 35, 35-37.
99. But see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 4 (1983) (advocating alternatives to adversary
decisionmaking); Paul R. Verkuil, The Self-Legitimating Bureaucracy, 93 YALE L.J. 780,
790-91 (1984) (endorsing Mashaw's search for an "internal" administrative process).
100. Cf. Daniel R. Ernst, Law and State, 1920-2000, in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW
IN AMERICA 33-34 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher L. Tomlins eds., 2004)
(documenting through the work of James Landis the later disaffection with New Deal
versions of bureaucracy).
101. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
102. Id. at 264 (constitutionalizing adversary-type welfare procedures under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
103. Unworkable in the sense that few government programs could measure up to the
demands to provide adversary procedures dictated by Goldberg. See Paul R. Verkuil, A
Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 777 (1976) (describing
numerous federal programs that failed to provide Goldberg procedures). Ultimately, the
decision costs of procedural changes and the potentially limited rewards in enhanced
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application of the Due Process Clause and the state action doctrine. 1°4
The Court has been retreating from intrusive procedural review ever
since,105 and Congress has also limited process rights in government
programs.0 6 As a result, the Due Process Clause has become a less
active monitoring device for assuring the rule of law.
D. The Present State of the Public-Private Distinction
In the 1990s, the distinction was further blurred when private
solutions became increasingly attractive alternatives to government
decision making. Spurred on by productivity goals that were
sweeping the private sector, 107 government was increasingly viewed as
inefficient and bloated. 108 When President Clinton announced that
the era of big government was over109 and Vice President Gore's
reinventing government initiative began downsizing government
employment,"0 the public interest was increasingly equated with
market solutions.
The fallout from this merger of public and private was
predictable: trust in government hit new lows in public opinion polls
and "bureaucracy" became a pejorative term."' When the
deregulation and privatization movements merged, the concept of
accuracy led the Court to establish a new due process standard of procedural balancing.
See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (creating a three-prong balancing test
to determine what procedures due process requires).
104. See Verkuil, supra note 62, at 672-73 (describing the judicial retrenching on due
process and state action after Goldberg). The pivotal case was Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974), where the Court refused to subject the procedures of
a state regulated utility to due process analysis. See also Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers,
Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 197 (2001) (finding due process adequately provided by common law
contract suit); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (finding no state
action under § 1983 in a state-authorized suit against a private insurer).
105. See PIERCE, SHAPIRO, & VERKUIL, supra note 18, § 6.3.1 (describing cases).
106. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (replacing AFDC payments with block grants and declaring no
entitlement in the grants).
107. Total Quality Management and reengineering were favorite concepts. See DAVID
OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR xix, 21-22, 159-60
(1992).
108. See Verkuil, supra note 21, at 4-9 (documenting government efforts to privatize
during the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton administrations).
109. See Verkuil, Understanding Public Interest, supra note 19, at 147.
110. Paul R. Verkuil, Is Efficient Government an Oxymoron?, 43 DUKE L.J. 1221,
1222-23 (1994).
111. See CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY 1-23 (4th ed. 2004)
(discussing the controversial nature of bureaucracy).
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"deregulating the public service" was born.112 It hardly seemed to
matter that the phrase had been misconstrued (it was meant to "free"
government employees to be more effective, not to turn over all
functions of government to the private sector113). The new lexicon of
government management now included "privatization," "public and
private partnerships," "deregulation," "downsizing," and "self-
regulation."'' 4
The success of these initiatives creates a new political reality.
Privatization places few limits on the exercise of public functions by
private contractors, and downsizing has led to fewer federal civilian
employees to do the work of the government.1 5 President Bush is
pushing to "privatize" 850,000 more civilian employees.'16 Some view
this development as further demonstration of a bloated
bureaucracy," 7 and surely some of the positions are unessential. But
continued contraction of the civil service also has adverse effects on
the public interest. Downsizing poses limits on both the capacity to
govern and the capacity to oversee or process those who do the work
of government. The rule of law values of oversight and
accountability, which first justified and then survived the era of direct
public control, cannot be realized without competent public officials.
Professional government leadership is increasingly in short supply.
Some day it may not be entirely facetious to ask, when the last
government employee leaves, will she please turn out the lights.
112. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., What Is Deregulating the Public Service, in
DEREGULATING THE PUBLIC SERVICE-CAN GOVERNMENT BE IMPROVED? 1, 1-5
(John J. Dilulio ed., 1994).
113. See Paul A. Volcker & William F. Winter, Introduction: Democracy and Public
Service, in DEREGULATING THE PUBLIC SERVICE-CAN GOVERNMENT BE IMPROVED?,
supra note 112, at xi-xvii. The authors state: "Unfortunately, the phrase deregulating the
public service invites possible confusion ... we are talking about pruning overgrown
government personnel regulations that make it exceedingly difficult to attract talented
people into public service .... " Id. at xvi. The authors conclude that "effective public
service is essential to our democracy." Id. at xvii.
114. See generally HARRISON, MORGAN, & VERKUIL, supra note 5, at 422-516
(describing these phrases).
115. The number of civilian employees is now below two million; that figure does not
include the Post Office, which accounts for almost 900,000 positions. See Volcker &
Winter, supra note 113, at 118 (charting government employees over the decades).
116. See Geoffrey F. Seagal, Realizing the President's Management Agenda, TECH
CENTRAL STATION, July 27, 2004 (extolling "public-private competitions where public
employees compete with the private sector to determine the best source of service
delivery"); see also discussion infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
117. See STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNING BY NETWORK:
THE NEW SHAPE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 21-23 (2004) (arguing for improved
government management over increased contracting out of public sector jobs); Stephen
Goldsmith & William D. Eggers, Government for Hire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at A19.
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In a way, our society has come full circle: from an early time
when civil society struggled to emerge, to a period when the liberal
state established separate realms of public and private, to the time
when government became virtually indispensable, to the present
when many things government does have devolved to the private
sector. For one who was enthusiastic about the "reinvention" of
government a decade ago,'18 the accomplishments of privatization are
impressive. But its very success now begs a more important question.
Perhaps privatization has succeeded too well. One can still applaud
the efficiency-based achievements it promised while questioning its
long term consequences. The questions are similar to those earlier
asked about the merging of the private and public sectors.1 19 The
Legal Realists were concerned about the public sector being merged
out of existence by substantive private norms (such as liberty of
contract); the present "merger" involves the private sector potentially
supplanting both public functions and public norms of administration.
Seen in this light, unrestrained delegation of government functions to
private hands challenges the role of government and the rule of law
that sustains it.
At stake in privatization (as opposed to downsizing) is not the
size of government in terms of expenditures.12 ° The issue is how to
improve the quality of government while retaining public sector
values.121  The number of key government officials, those who are
presidential appointees or members of the Senior Executive Service
("SES") has remained static, or even declined, while their oversight
responsibilities have grown dramatically. 122  The outsourcing of
government functions and the downsizing produced by the
reinvention movement has resulted in the perfect storm for public
118. See Verkuil, supra note 21, at 10-12.
119. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
120. Privatization does not involve shrinking the size of government. See Floyd Norris,
In the Bush Years, Government Grows as the Private Sector Struggles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
2004, at C1 (describing how the government's share of GDP has risen under the Bush
administration).
121. This problem is presented by the faith-based initiative process, which places
religious institutions in the position of dispensing government benefits. For this to work,
public sector values must co-exist with religious values. See John J. Dilulio, Jr.,
Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1271, 1276-78 (2003).
122. There are only about 500 presidential appointees (excluding ambassadors) with
full-time jobs and another 1,000 Schedule C (policy determining) officials. See U.S.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF WORKFORCE INFORMATION,
POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS BY TYPE AND WORK SCHEDULE (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/POL0901.pdf. There are about 6,000 members of the SES.
See infra note 378.
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control-a vacuum of senior leadership at a time when government is
increasingly at risk.'23
It used to be fashionable to deprecate the quality of
government-"running against Washington" was a reliable vote-
getter. But our love-hate relationship with government may once
again be changing.124  In the post 9/11 world,'25 the public is
recognizing that government is needed both to define and oversee
new responsibilities.126 Social Security reform proposals have alerted
the public to the downside of privatization. The term itself has
become so controversial that the Bush administration now forbids its
use in that context.'27 Renewed government credibility has produced
new opportunities for the public sector. Ideas that can align political
forces around public responsibility for public acts 2' may now be as
compelling as the rallying cry of privatization. 12 9
To decide if privatization has reached its limits, we must know
whether "inherent functions"13 of government are being delegated.
It may be no easier to locate these functions than it was to determine
what businesses are affected with a public interest, what private
actions are public functions, or what property transfers amount to
public use.3 But the inquiry cannot be avoided. Certain exercises of
public authority in the liberal state still must be performed by
123. The Iraq war and the Hurricane Katrina disaster have embroiled government in
the highly risky activity of no-bid contracting where oversight by public officials is vital.
See infra notes 216-18.
124. Cf. JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY-THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 7-12 (1978) (documenting the American love-
hate relationship with bureaucracy).
125. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 395 (2004), available at http://www.9-11
commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (describing the sacrifices of public officials like fire
and police).
126. See Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211
(2003) (raising this question). See generally JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION
181-86 (1986) (documenting the role "public administration" plays in implementing the
Founders' Constitution).
127. See Editorial, Mr. Bush's Two Big Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A26 (noting
that President Bush no longer uses the term "privatized" in connection with Social
Security because "polls showed that the American people reacted badly to the concept").
128. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003) (using the term "publicization" as a counterpoint to
"privatization").
129. There are signs that Congress is aware of the negative effects that downsizing has
had on the government's capacity to govern. The Senate Armed Services Committee
recently concluded "that continuing problems [in contracting] are attributable, in
significant part, to inadequate human capital planning and continued reductions in the
defense acquisition workforce." S. REP. NO. 109-69, at 344 (2005).
130. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing OMB Circular A-76).
131. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq).
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government. These duties are nondelegable, or at least not delegable
without continuing governmental oversight. The public-private
distinction still has a role to play in locating limits on the transfer of
political power to private hands.
II. PRIVATIZATION, NONDELEGATION, AND DUE PROCESS
The threat privatization poses to standard assumptions about
public control of decision authority is of recent origin. But the
constitutional theories that might be employed to secure against this
threat, such as the nondelegation doctrine, have been around for a
long time. In addition, statutory provisions, such as the
Subdelegation Act and judicial review provisions of the APA, can
also play a role in controlling delegations to private hands. This Part
of the Article connects these public law doctrines and statutory
authorities to outline themes of regulatory control over the
privatization process.
A. Private Nondelegation
Challenges to the transfer of public power to the private sector
start with the nondelegation doctrine. Nondelegation seeks to cure
the unchecked transfer of legislative power to the executive. While it
has shown occasional signs of life, the doctrine has been moribund
since the end of the Lochner era.132 However, Professor Metzger
shows that nondelegation has continuing vitality and remains
connected to the public-private distinction.'33 Thus, even though the
doctrine in its traditional guise has few friends, 34 when adapted to
132. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1935). In Schechter, Justice
Cardozo's concurrence about "delegation running riot" has become the classic
formulation of the nondelegation of legislative power position. 295 U.S. at 553; see DAVID
SCHOENBRUM, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 155-64 (1995) (praising the
nondelegation doctrine and discussing cases). As Professor Rubin has pointed out, the
nondelegation doctrine has only been applied against the National Industrial Recovery
Act where public power was transferred to private hands. See Rubin, supra note 4, at 2095
n.7.
133. After extensively reviewing the cases, Professor Metzger concludes that the
"private delegation doctrine" is a casualty of the post-Lochner era. But she also views it
as a possible road to be taken by Congress or the courts. See Metzger, supra note 92, at
1441-43; see also Freeman, supra note 128, at 1285 (suggesting that Congress could require
public actors to adhere to public law norms in exchange for privatizing activities).
134. See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper" Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235,236-37 (2005) (arguing for a middle
road on nondelegation that reconciles the competing camps); Eric Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331, 1331 (2003). But see
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the needs of our time, it -may have vitality. For example, Professor
Merrill proposes jettisoning the nondelegation doctrine in favor of an
"exclusive delegation doctrine" which focuses solely on whether
Congress has acted at all, not how carefully it has acted.'35 This is a
creative adjustment to political and constitutional realities and opens
the way for a rethinking of its purposes in the privatization setting.
The question, as phrased by Professor Metzger, is not so much
whether Congress can delegate legislative power (or in Professor
Merrill's terms whether it has delegated its power) to the executive,
but whether government (either Congress or the executive branch)
can subdelegate that power to the private sector, and, if so, under
what conditions. This inquiry presents the two faces of the
nondelegation doctrine-its Article I and its due process dimensions,
along with the newly formulated exclusive delegation doctrine.
Carter v. Carter Coal136 offers the traditional departure point.
The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act'37 established "districts"
wherein a district board elected by coal operators and unions would
set wages binding upon all coal producers. For Justice Sutherland
and the Carter Coal majority "[tihis [was] legislative delegation in its
most obnoxious form; for it [was] not even delegation to an official or
an official body, presumptively disinterested."'38 The Court held the
delegation arbitrary both under Article I of the Constitution and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.139 The delegation
failed under Article I because it transferred the legislative power to
set wages; it failed as a matter of procedural due process because
there was no public oversight of the exercise of private power.
But these two dimensions were redundant. As Louis Jaffe
suggested in his analysis of Carter Coal,14 ° "we might drop the word
'delegation' completely, at least as indicating a constitutional
category, and regard the question simply as one of reasonableness
David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDoZO L.
REV. 731, 732 (1999) (discussing unreconstructed nondelegation).
135. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2109 (2004).
136. 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see also Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government
Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 575 (discussing the Carter Coal doctrine).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 801-827 (2000) (repealed 1937).
138. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
139. Id.
140. See Louis L. Jaffe, Lawmaking by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 248
(1937); see also Metzger, supra note 92, at 1443-44 (relating the private lawmaking point
to delegation issues).
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within the due process clause."14' Professor Jaffe perceived that due
process could become the face of the delegation doctrine that would
survive federally. 142  As Professor Tribe noted much later, "[t]he
judicial hostility to private lawmaking ... represents a persistent
theme in American constitutional law.'
'1 43
Though federal nondelegation arguments based on separation of
powers are rarely successful, 144 the due process dimensions of
nondelegation can still reach to federal and state regulatory
schemes. 45  Even under Merrill's alternative exclusive delegation
theory there is room for the due process approach. Professor Merrill
argues that the nondelegation doctrine does not distinguish between
private or public delegatees despite Carter Coal, but he offers several
alternative theories, including due process, that might constrain
delegations to private parties. 146  Professors Merrill and Jaffe both
141. Jaffe, supra note 140, at 204. As Jaffe noted, this is presumably what must be
done when the Court is confronted with a state regulation.
142. Indeed, it is possible to explain the Panama and Schechter cases in due process
terms. If one uses Justice Cardozo's dissent in Panama and concurrence in Schechter as
touchstones, the presence of express state regulatory control over "hot oil" in Panama
(through the Texas Commission) provides a due process rationale that was missing in the
purely privately promulgated NIRA Code at stake in Schechter. The latter situation is
much closer to that in Carter Coal. Admittedly, Justice Cardozo focused less on due
process than interstate commerce in his concurrence. But it was the breathtaking scope of
the NIRA, dealing as he said with the "welfare of the nation" that galvanized him. See
ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 508-12 (1998) (noting that it was Cardozo's Panama
dissent he was most proud of).
143. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 993 (3d ed. 2000).
144. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (rejecting a
nondelegation challenge); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 845 (1984) (delegating legal questions to agencies where Congress has not resolved
the issue directly); see also TRIBE, supra note 143, at 993-96 (explaining the current
application of the nondelegation doctrine).
State constitutional analysis, by contrast, still emphasizes the separation of powers
aspect of nondelegation. See, e.g., Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen,
952 S.W.2d 454, 456-58 (Tex. 1997) (challenging delegation to a private foundation,
certified by the Commissioner of Agriculture, establishing eradication zones, assessing
growers, and destroying crops of non-paying growers); see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming
Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
551, 562 (2001) (stating that nearly twenty states endorse a rigorous nondelegation
doctrine).
145. The due process aspect of nondelegation may be stronger as a challenge to state
legal regimes. See TRIBE, supra note 143, at 988-92 (describing due process constraints on
state delegations to private parties). The procedural due process cases which led to the
demise of the right-privilege distinction apply to federal and state regulatory schemes. See
supra notes 101-05.
146. See Merrill, supra note 135, at 2165-69 (reserving the due process aspects of
delegation while jettisoning the Article I ("intelligible principle") dimension). Professor
Merrill also offers a "three branch" constraint that would seem to limit private
delegations. Id. at 2168.
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offer alternatives that can sidestep the judicial reluctance to revive a
due process based nondelegation doctrine. 47
Of course, due process theory can carry the privatization debate
only so far: it can only control private delegations through procedural
constraints on the exercise of private power.148  Still, Professor
Metzger argues that is no small step-private delegations with
process attached facilitate public oversight and accountability. 49 But
the idea of inherent governmental functions implies something more
powerful-limits on delegations or subdelegations that cannot be
justified procedurally. Absolute limits on the delegation of public
powers require constitutional arguments that are not easily mustered.
The public-private distinction divides functions into separate realms.
Neither the nondelegation doctrine nor the exclusive delegation
doctrine addresses the larger problem of what might be called the true
nondelegation doctrine, i.e., the proposition that some government
functions are nondelegable under any circumstances.
B. Nondelegation, Subdelegation, and Discretionary Acts
Once an inherent government power is identified, can it be
delegated at all? Nondelegation, in both its Article I and due process
faces, is still about process. Nondelegation requires that Congress
create "ascertainable standards" for the executive branch to follow,
but does not forbid the delegation ab initio.15 ° Professor Merrill's
exclusive delegation theory is satisfied once an express grant of
delegated or subdelegated power is found. The most Carter Coal's
due process constraint accomplishes is to provide procedural
mechanisms for government officials to oversee the exercise of
private power.
But certain government functions may be so fundamental as not
to be transferable to private hands under any circumstances. Acts of
government committed to high officials, including the President, who
have taken oaths to uphold the Constitution fall into this category."'
147. See cases cited supra note 144.
148. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976) (creating a balancing of
interests test to evaluate procedures).
149. See discussion supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
150. Of course, a rigorously enforced nondelegation doctrine also forbids delegations
since Congress may be unable politically to satisfy such a strict test. In this way,
nondelegation could transmute itself into a form of substantive due process that also
forbids delegation. See PIERCE, SHAPIRO, & VERKUIL, supra note 18, at 48-49.
151. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring oaths or affirmations to support the
institution of all federal and state legislative, executive, and judicial officers); see also
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that taking the
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But calling some government acts nondelegable does not identify
them. Just what are the functions of government that cannot be
privatized?
1. Nondelegable Duties of Government
Some duties have always been nondelegable. We can all agree
with Justice Scalia that Congress cannot hand the legislative power to
the President and adjourn sine die. 52 By a parity of reasoning, the
President cannot turn the executive power over to the Vice President
and retire in office. 53 These are clear examples of nondelegable
duties of office under the Constitution. But how far beyond these
obvious examples does the inherent limitation on delegation go?
Important powers exercised by Cabinet officials and other principal
officers presumably must be exercised by those who have taken an
oath to uphold the Constitution.'54 Thus, the Secretary of Defense
cannot delegate the power to conduct the war in Iraq to the Rand
Corporation any more than the Attorney General can leave it to
private (rather than "special") counsel to decide when to prosecute.'55
In these situations, the core responsibility is both to exercise and to
oversee the exercise of government powers. Stated more broadly, the
oath to uphold the Constitution sometimes allows executive officials "to perform that oath
unreviewed"); discussion infra notes 181-82.
152. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Our members of Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all power to the President
and adjourn sine die."). Justice Scalia's Mistretta dissent noted that some duties of
legislators, such as voting on bills, cannot be delegated. Id. at 425. Justice Scalia also calls
the Sentencing Commission a "junior-varsity Congress." Id. at 427. One wonders whether
he might apply the same pejorative to private legislative delegatees such as standard
setting organizations. See discussion infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text; see also
TRIBE, supra note 143, at 982 (the legislative power as a whole is not transferable).
153. Cf. Peter L. Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 190 (1985) (questioning the Vice
President's role in overseeing the rulemaking process).
154. Duties of principal officers are nondelegable both because of the oath or
affirmation requirement, see supra note 151, and because of the Senate's advise and
consent function in Article II. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 1. Any officer confirmed by the
Senate owes a duty both to the President and to the Congress to perform her
responsibilities directly; the Senate is consenting to the exercise of duties by the officer
confirmed, not by some unconfirmed private subdelegatee. Moreover, the impeachment
power is also implicated because Congress cannot hold the private subdelegatee
responsible through its exercise.
155. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 802-09 (1987)
(finding that the Attorney General's duty to be disinterested disqualified a private
attorney from presenting a violation of a court order).
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duty to be accountable for public decisions is not a function
performable by those outside government.'56
2. The Subdelegation Act
Some power to delegate within government is necessary to make
the system work. Even though the President embodies the executive
power under Article I, he cannot carry out all duties directly.57
Realizing this, Congress long ago gave the President the power to
delegate to his subordinates. Under the Subdelegation Act,158
delegations can be made without specific legislation. But these
delegations have limits: they can only be made to Officers of the
United States. And even though the Act delegates to the President
the unrestricted power to subdelegate without express legislative
authority, it has not been challenged on nondelegation grounds.5 9
Moreover, the Act is unlikely to upset those with a unitary view of the
President's powers since it is permissive rather than restrictive."6 The
Subdelegation Act is also consistent with the exclusive delegation
theory posited by Professor Merrill.' The idea that the President
156. The Attorney General's constitutional control over litigation for the United States
has to be reconciled with qui tam suits that permit private parties to represent the
government in certain circumstances. See, e.g., The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-
3733 (2000). These actions have been available since the beginning of our constitutional
period, but their anomalous nature still raises nondelegation questions under Article II's
Appointments and Take Care clauses. See Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000) (Scalia, J.) (upholding the False Claims Act
against an Article III challenge, but reserving the question as to Article II); see also FEC
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 34-37 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that citizen attorney
general provisions of Act may violate the President's Article II requirement of "faithful
execution" of the laws).
157. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (expressing Chief Justice
Taft's expansive view on the necessity of the President to control the bureaucracy).
158. 3 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (2000) (permitting delegation by the President to any official
required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, unless
affirmatively prohibited by Congress). -
159. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 134, at 1335 ("But to our knowledge, no one
has ever suggested that the Subdelegation Act violates the Constitution .... "). And since
the subdelegations are limited to public officials, they would not involve the Carter Coal
variations on the nondelegation doctrine. See supra notes 138-42.
160. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 571 (1994) (advocating an expansive reading of
Article II). Conceivably, unitarians could object to any statute that channels, if not limits,
the President's powers as the Subdelegation Act does. If they went this far, the contrary
view expressed by Professor Stack would have resonance. See Kevin Stack, The Statutory
President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541-46 (2005) (describing the ways in which Congress has
long delegated power directly and exclusively to the President and other executive
officials).
161. The virtue of Professor Merrill's exclusive delegation approach is that it removes
any concerns about standardless delegations under the Subdelegation Act. See Merrill,
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needs to delegate to his cabinet officials or other officers of the
United States recognizes the realities of modern government. The
Subdelegation Act grants the executive branch extensive authority to
organize the Administration in this spirit. 162
But the Act contains a more powerful lesson for present
purposes-it is both a grant to and a limitation upon the executive
branch's power to subdelegate. 63  By limiting delegations to
government officials, indeed to high government officials, the Act
implicitly denies the President authority to delegate to lesser public
officials or to outside parties.16" So defined, the Subdelegation Act
amounts to a congressional early warning system. If the executive
tries to delegate powers to private parties, the Subdelegation Act
tests whether these delegations are consistent with the exercise of
executive authority. Congress can then decide whether to approve
subdelegations to private hands through enabling legislation.
Reading the Act in this manner reflects existing practice.
Congress has in fact permitted some delegations to private
contractors in statutes like the Federal Activities Inventory Reform
Act (the "FAIR Act"). The harder constitutional question-
whether, without the Subdelegation Act, the President must have the
inherent power to delegate duties assigned to him by Congress 166 -- is
not raised in the private delegation context. The President could
never claim an inherent power to delegate official duties to private
supra note 135, at 2179. But under the exclusive delegation theory, the existence of some
statutory delegation, rather than implied executive authority to subdelegate, is essential.
See id. at 2175-76.
162. The Subdelegation Act dates to the Reorganization Act of 1951, which in turn was
based on the Hoover Commission reorganization plan. See THE HOOVER COMMISSION
REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 433-
39 (1949).
163. Over the years the courts have limited subdelegations under this act. See Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 788, 788 (1942) (amending an earlier decision, Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942)); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554,
567-68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (limiting independent agency delegation to state authority).
164. In U.S. Telecom, the court emphasized that "the cases recognize an important
distinction between subdelegation to a subordinate and subdelegation to an outside party."
359 F.3d at 565.
165. See discussion infra note 344 and accompanying text. For an argument on the
negative implications of the Subdelegation Act as it applies to Executive Orders, see
discussion infra notes 324-325 and accompanying text.
166. The President cannot ignore congressional decisions to place political power in the
hands of specific cabinet officers. See Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 965, 986 (1997) (arguing that the President wields executive power within
congressional constraints); see also Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., Judicial Review of the
Subdelegation of Presidential Power, 12 J. POLITICS 668, 684-89 (1950) (describing cases
limiting presidential powers to subdelegate).
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hands. In fact when phrased this way, the constitutional limits on
private delegations seem unexceptionable.
3. The Role of Discretion, Politics, and Oaths
The President and other executive officials exercise inherent and
political powers that derive from separation of powers principles
under Article I. They are discretionary and may not be second-
guessed by the courts or limited by Congress. The well known
formulation is that of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison"':
By the constitution of the United States, the President is
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise
of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only
to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is
authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority
and in conformity with his orders. 6 '
The touchstone is the politically sensitive and discretionary
nature of decisionmaking about core decisions of government. As to
these decisions, even Congress, which can assign most substantive
delegations to executive officials, is constitutionally limited in how it
can control aspects of that power. 69 But the acknowledged genius of
Marbury is that while it insulated certain political acts from judicial
scrutiny, it also established principles of judicial review over other
government actions affecting individuals. 7'
A further implication of Marbury relates to the privatization
issue. The President is protected in the exercise of his political
powers personally (or as to certain appointed officers). But this
category must be limited to public officials. Only officials of
government who are oath takers can discharge these protected duties.
Executive privilege protects "the President against judicial intrusion
167. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
168. Id. at 165-66.
169. The appointment and removal cases plumb the depths of what is both inherent
and not subject to congressional control. See Humphrey v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
629 (1935) (permitting congressional removal restrictions for quasi-judicial officials);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding even inferior executive officers-
i.e., postmasters-free from congressional removal); see also United States v. Perkins, 116
U.S. 483, 484-85 (1886) (stating that civil service restrictions are constitutional).
170. See Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 15-17 (1983) (describing the judicial review imperatives of Marbury).
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into official acts," '' but these official acts only apply to acts by
"officials."
Another way to view this exercise of protected political
discretion is to compare it to the "discretionary function" exception in
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 72  This provision gives statutory
expression to the limitations upon judicial review of political
functions that the executive branch performs."' Discretionary
functions equate to sovereign functions that the President cannot be
held accountable for at law.'74 Under Marbury, these would be
unreviewable "political powers." '175 Thus, government conduct driven
by discretion (political judgment or choice) is immune from tort law if
it involves a policy making official. 76 The broader the range of
judgment the official possesses, the greater the need for discretion.
By a parity of reasoning, if the executive official exercising
discretionary powers cannot be held accountable, she cannot delegate
that discretion to others who are not officials of government. The
higher the level of decision involved, the greater the need for the
decisionmaker to be a government official. Candidates for this
category would include not only cabinet officers but perhaps all
"Officers of the United States."' 77
171. In Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 375-77 (2004), Vice
President Cheney claimed that receiving advice from the private sector for energy policy is
protected by executive privilege. And this position was upheld. See In re Cheney, 406
F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the Vice President need only certify
that decision authority on energy policy was not delegated to the private sector).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000) (limiting waiver of the sovereign immunity of the
United States).
173. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(6), 2671-2680 (2000).
174. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953) (discussing a cabinet level
decision to initiate a fertilizer program that led to a disastrous explosion); see also Gager v.
United States, 149 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the Postal Service's decision not
to provide universal training and supervision in mail bomb detection fell within
discretionary function exception because it involved judgment or choice on the part of
postal officials); First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v. United States, 552 F.2d 370, 376 (10th
Cir. 1977) (holding actions of government employees in registering mercury fungicide for
interstate sale and approving labeling of fungicide pursuant to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act fell within discretionary function exception).
175. See supra text accompanying note 168 (quoting Marbury v. Madison).
176. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 319 (1991) (holding supervisory
decision of the Home Loan Bank Board to be within the discretionary function). Justice
Scalia's concurrence elaborates on the connection between the level of decisionmaker and
the scope of judgment or choice. Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring).
177. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 4. To the extent that officers of the United States are
subject to the advise and consent function, privatization of their duties would be offensive
to the constitutional powers of two branches. See supra note 154.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
There is also a connection between the nondelegation of certain
functions of executive officers and judicial review under the APA.
Under § 701(a)(2), judicial review is not available when actions are
"committed to agency discretion by law.' 1 78 The Court in Webster v.
Doe179 held that this provision denies review when statutory violations
are asserted, but left open the question of whether review can also be
denied when constitutional violations are asserted.1 8° Justice Scalia's
dissent in Webster argues for the latter interpretation, but in so doing
assumes that these decisions, especially if unreviewable, must be
made by federal officials who have taken an oath to uphold the
Constitution.' Justice Scalia shows us that the oath requirement is
no mere formality." 2 It confirms the fact that some government
actions must be taken by public officials; this would also be true for
the "committed to discretion" provision to apply. Private contractors,
as non-oath takers, are excluded from the highest levels of
government.
Of course, conceptualizing a category of mandatory government
actors is not the same thing as identifying them. While it is unrealistic
to think Congress could create a personnel table'83 for this purpose, it
is in Congress' interests to know how far such delegations can go.
The Subdelegation Act alerts Congress by limiting the delegatees
Congress approves of in advance to Officers of the United States.
This is the standard unless Congress changes that category by specific
legislation. The Supreme Court finds it difficult to define a category
of officials with discretionary duties beyond Officers of the United
178., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000).
179. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
180. Id. at 601 (holding section 102(C) of the National Security Act unreviewable
under section 701(a)(2)). See generally Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability
in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) (discussing the category of
unreviewable administrative action that is committed to agency discretion).
181. Justice Scalia states:
In sum, it is simply untenable that there must be a judicial remedy for every
constitutional violation. Members of Congress and the supervising officers of the
Executive Branch take the same oath to uphold the Constitution that we do, and
sometimes they are left to perform that oath unreviewed, as we always are.
Webster, 486 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. As Professor Amar has shown, the Constitution's drafters relied on the oath
requirement to discourage "by making dishonorable" any attempts by legislators to pass
unconstitutional legislation. See AHKIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 62-63 (2005).
183. It might be possible, for example, for Congress to list these qualifying officials, as
it does for the "independent" regulatory agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 104 (2000) (defining




States.184 But it might well decide that the category of discretionary
officials can never include private contractors. Webster v. Doe, which
has difficulty deciding on the scope of judicial review, clearly places
great emphasis on the oath requirement. It could lead the Court to
employ a real nondelegation doctrine,'85 one that holds discretionary
tasks must remain in the hands of public officers. Private contractors
can never qualify to exercise these powers.
4. The Connection Between State Action and Inherent Functions
Another way the Court has approached the question of
nondelegable duties is to view them after the fact. Sometimes
legislatures delegate to private hands duties of a public nature and the
courts have no choice but to second guess the result. The public
function test186 labels some actions "state action" after they have been
delegated to private parties. The Court is reluctant to create a
category of inherent government functions in this fashion,187 but it
retains the power to do so. Moreover, the state action concept does
not limit the functions that government can delegate. Instead it
"constitutionalizes" after-the-fact delegations that amount to the
exercise of public authority.18
These cases highlight the Court's role in preventing government
from avoiding constitutional responsibilities through the private
delegation device. In Lebron v. National Rail Passenger Corp,189 for
example, the Court held that Amtrak, a government corporation with
private directors, was for First Amendment purposes still the
government and could not impose content restrictions on
advertising. 19° Justice Scalia's majority opinion makes it clear that
government could not avoid its constitutional responsibilities by the
184. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1988) (distinguishing between
principal and inferior officers); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 162 (1926)
(distinguishing between officers and employees). The total number of full-time political
appointees including presidential appointees with or without Senate confirmation, non-
career Senior Executives, and Schedule C appointees is 1,847. See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS.
MGMT., CENTRAL PERSONNEL DATA FILE (2001), http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/
employment.asp.
185. See discussion supra note 132-35 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
187. Justice O'Connor has stated that "cases deciding when private action might be
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency." Edmonson v. Leeville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. The state action cases determine when some private functions become public or
sovereign acts. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997) (holding
private prison guards subject to § 1983 liability).
189. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
190. Id. at 400.
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delegation device of a corporate charter.191  Lebron thus sets
important limits upon the government's ability to privatize by
suggesting that the Court will oversee legislative attempts to avoid
public responsibilities through delegations to private regimes.
Admittedly, Lebron does not indicate that the Court will
entertain a restraint upon the act of delegation itself. But it helps
preserves the public role of government. The Subdelegation Act is
one limitation upon outsourcing of important government functions.
Lebron provides another. These limitations provide a framework
around which Congress can structure limits on privatization. The
Subdelegation Act and the state action cases can be viewed as efforts
by Congress and the courts to preserve the public-private distinction.
III. DELEGATION OF PUBLIC POWER TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Public functions have long been delegated to private hands at all
levels of government. While other examples could have been
chosen, 92 the two selected highlight the broad contours of the policy
delegation problem raised in the last Part. These are: (1) the use of
standard setting organizations to produce off-the-shelf legislative
enactments; and (2) the practice of "contracting out" by the federal
government, especially as that process involves the distinction
between competitive sourcing and inherent government functions.
These examples show that both the legislative and executive branches
have experience with privatization and that they have anticipated the
resulting oversight and accountability problems. The contracting out
phenomenon is subjected to more elaborate analysis in Section B. It
has military as well as civilian dimensions, and it includes important
new functions like the status of airport screeners.
191. "It surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the most
solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate
form." Id. at 397.
192. Other examples of privatization, such as the provision of welfare and health care,
faith based initiatives, and prison services have been well explored elsewhere and will not
be repeated here. See Freeman, supra note 128, at 1306-14; Metzger, supra note 92, at
1376; David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organization: A Problem
Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1361-64 (2003) (describing the mixed motives
behind public-religious partnerships). See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private
Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing private standard setting in regulatory accounting);
Michael P. Vanderbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (documenting the extensive interaction between private and public
actions especially in the area of environmental regulation).
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A. Standard Setting Organizations as Private Legislatures
Privatization is not just the result of executive action; it is part of
the legislative process as well. Legislatures often consult Standard
Setting Organizations ("SSOs"), which provide private,
professionally-based expertise in highly technical matters. 93 Both
state legislatures and Congress delegate authority to these groups to
formulate standards. These privately produced standards are then
incorporated directly into law.
This practice is so accepted that its nondelegation aspects seem
never to have been addressed.194 In fact, the opposite often occurs-
SSOs are given the equivalent of public status through judicial
immunities when their work is challenged under antitrust laws.1 95
SSOs set standards of performance through thousands of model
codes.'9 6 This privatization of legislative authority is done under
explicit mandates of Congress 97 and many state legislatures.' 98 It has
also received the approval of the Supreme Court.'9 9
193. For example, the safety of boilers and pressure vessels is determined by privately
created boiler codes that states incorporate into law. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.180
(2003). See generally Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982) (discussing American Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") codes).
194. The nondelegation doctrine has been concerned with the transfer of legislative
power to the executive branch, see supra notes 132-35, more than with the transfer of
legislative power to private hands. Moreover, since the legislature enacts the privately
created standards, the delegation, even if questionable, may be cured by subsequent
actions. If the legislation incorporates future changes to standards set by SSOs without
requiring subsequent legislation, however, that "cure" is not available. See Christopher L.
Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: A Case Study in the
Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1473 (2004) (discussing state
legislatures' prospective adoption of ABA rules).
195. See id. (criticizing the expansive nature of antitrust and First Amendment
exemptions for SSOs); see also David Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371,
447-48 (2003) (suggesting that "private lawmaking is accomplished through a variety of
means, including legislative and judicial adoption").
196. See Sagers, supra note 194, at 1398-1401.
197. For example, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Organizations,
composed of nongovernmental representatives of private industry and professional
associates, determines which healthcare providers may treat Medicaid recipients. See Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 617-18 (2000).
198. See Sagers, supra note 194, at 1398 (collecting state laws incorporating private
codes).
199. The opposition to the use of SSOs has largely been due to antitrust, not
delegation, concerns. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,
502-04 (1998) (denying Noerr doctrine immunity to an SSO); see also Am. Soc'y of Mech.
Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570-76 (1982) (holding that SSOs are not liable
for antitrust violation); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S.
656, 659-60 (1961) (per curiam) (same). Cf. Jody Freeman, Privatization: Private Parties,
Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 819-20 (2000)
(confirming the judicial acceptance of SSOs).
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The public interest is only preserved in these private delegations
through procedural means. Legislatures require SSOs to create
standards through an open and inclusive process. For example,
Congress in the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act,2°° requires executive branch agencies to use "voluntary
standards" in establishing policy unless to do so would be
"inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical. ' 21' The OMB
circular accompanying the Act says that "due process" standards
must be observed by SSOs. 2°2 What due process means in this context
is not explained, but it presumably includes requirements of openness
and transparency of membership in the SSO and its deliberations.2 3
The message of Carter Coal, that delegation to private bodies can be
accepted, indeed even encouraged, so long as there is some public
check on their exercise, is implicit in OMB's due process formula.
Whether that formula works in practice to adequately preserve the
public interest is not easy to determine, however.
Some measure of procedural control can also come through the
application of the antitrust laws. SSOs that set standards for industry
behavior are engaging in potentially anticompetitive conduct-
perhaps a group boycott or price fixing under the antitrust laws. The
courts provide a safe haven from antitrust scrutiny in two ways:
through application of the Noerr-Pennington First Amendment
immunity2 4 or the Midcal immunity2 5 at the state level. California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 20 6 involved
200. Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
201. Id., 110 Stat. at 783.
202. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR A-76, at A-2, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_
incl _techcorrection.pdf [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-76]. See discussion infra notes 225-226
and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 136-42 (discussing Carter Coal's requirements). Whether the
procedures outlined by OMB would satisfy due process if they are challenged by those
affected is another matter altogether. See discussion supra notes 101-104 (discussing the
evolving due process requirements for government programs).
204. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965) (applying
First Amendment protection to anticompetitive actions seeking legislation); E. R.R.
Presidents' Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-39 (1961) (stating that
where restraint of trade or monopolization is the result of valid government action there is
no violation of the Sherman Act); Mass. School of Law v. ABA, 107 F.3d 1026, 1041 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding restraints on limiting access to the state bar exam to ABA accredited
law schools protected by the First Amendment petitioning immunity).
205. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980). The immunity test is whether the SSO sets standards pursuant to (1) clearly
articulated state policy and (2) whether that policy is actively supervised by the state. Id.
206. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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retail price fixing at the behest of the state. Midcal "state
supervision" is really a procedural requirement-designed to ensure
that the resulting standard, otherwise a restraint on trade, is both
intended by the state and then kept within bounds established by the
state. 2°7 These limitations are similar to those applied to SSOs that
require openness by including non-industry or public members in
their ranks and a willingness to consider views of outsiders.2 8
At the federal level, the recently enacted Standards
Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004209 provides
limited immunity against antitrust damages for entities under its
regime. Research and development efforts and joint ventures are
entitled to rule of reason and single damages protections if they
register with the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission. The fact of registration implies transparency and offers
further opportunity for government oversight. Both of these
conditions foster government accountability over private entities.210
Immunity from antitrust laws for private regulatory bodies has
also been connected to the presence of due process procedures. In
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange211 the Court introduced the idea
that antitrust immunity for stock exchanges could depend upon
whether the self-regulatory body disciplined members consistent with
due process. 12 The Silver case reflects the same concept at the
federal level that Midcal's state supervision requirement does at the
207. Id. at 105-06.
208. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
209. Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661, 664 (2004) (to be codified as amendments to
the National Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305); see also
U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR A-119, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a1l9/a1l9.html
(supplementing the Act).
210. In a related context, the OMB has implemented the Information Quality Act,
Pub. L. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), by providing for peer review of information
produced by agencies for public consumption. See Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and
Information Quality, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,023 (Sept. 15, 2003). While peer review fosters
government accountability, the OMB procedures have been criticized for not going far
enough. See Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10066-67 (2004) (criticizing OMB for exempting peer review procedures from the
Federal Advisory Committee Act).
211. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
212. Id. at 362-63. But see Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985) (stating that "the absence of procedural safeguards can in no
sense determine antitrust analysis"). The Supreme Court is hesitant to turn the antitrust
laws into a surrogate procedural law for private organizations, but its Midcal decision
keeps the connection alive.
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state level.2 13 Both immunities respect Carter Coal's admonition that
the exercise of delegated public power by private bodies must be
done with some degree of public oversight.214
The due process principles contained in the Technology Transfer
Act and the antitrust immunity cases show that government will not
share its public role without some assurances of transparency and
accountability. However, proper controls over the private exercise of
public powers remains a central issue of government management.
When the focus shifts from privatized delegations by the legislature to
the executive, oversight issues are even more significant. The
contracting out process, next considered, has expanded to the degree
that controls are stretched thin. Viewed in a Midcal sense, "state
supervision" may be lacking when privatized functions operate with
inadequate government oversight.
B. Contracting Out and the Circular A-76 Process
Contracting out-outsourcing-the provision of services by the
government has a long history.215 Most of this activity takes place
between agency contracting officers and selected private vendors of
services; contracts are usually awarded after competitive bidding. But
recently the number of performance-based or single sourced contracts
has been growing.216 This is especially true in connection with
Department of Defense contracts for private military services in
213. The FTC has issued a report that brings "due process" requirements to the "active
supervision" requirement of Midcal. See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF POLICY
PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 52-54, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OO3/O9/stateactionreport.pdf; see also FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT IN INDIANA
HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND WAREHOUSEMEN, INC., File No. 021-0115, at 3 (2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/indianahouseholdmoversanalysis.pdf (applying
the Report of the State Action Task Force); cf FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621,
637-40 (1992) (seeking procedural supervision requirements).
214. See discussion supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
215. See Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Vision; Time for
Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 321, 326-29 (2004) (documenting earlier efforts
to contract out during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations).
216. See Kimberly Palmer, Performance-Based Contracting 'Not Working,' Industry
Leader Says, GOVEXEC.com (May 17, 2005), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0505/
051705kl.htm (stating that "[i]n fiscal 2004, $41.66 billion worth of procurements were
noncompetitive").
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Iraq 217 and with Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA")
contracts after Hurricane Katrina.218
Sometimes outsourcing is conducted under OMB's Circular A-76
process, which requires that "competitive sourcing" involve private
vendors.2 19  This process permits government services to be
outsourced only after a review process and makes "inherent"
government functions ineligible to be outsourced at all. In this way,
the A-76 process reflects concerns earlier expressed about the
outsourcing of significant government functions.2 °
The Bush administration, as part of its downsizing project, has
expanded the conditions under which contracting out may be
employed. In May 2003, OMB's Circular A-76 was amended to
encourage contracting out (or "competitive sourcing"), 221 and in
September 2003 OMB issued a report: "Competitive Sourcing and
Responsible Public-Private Competition" that documented the
government's success at contracting out.222
217. See John Swain, Making a Killing, SUNDAY TIMES MAG. (London), Oct. 23, 2005,
at 40, 40-45 (documenting contracts for private military services in Iraq that have made
the private military the second largest force in Iraq after the United States military itself).
218. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Stumbling Storm-Aid Effort Put Tons of Ice
on Trips to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at Al (describing contracting errors in
FEMA's provision of supplies to storm victims).
219. See Verkuil, supra note 21, at 8-12 (describing OMB's Circular A-76 policy).
220. See discussion supra notes 151-56.
221. See CIRCULAR A-76, supra note 202, at Attachment A, pt. B, § 1(a) (narrowing
nondelegable functions by changing "requiring the exercise of discretion" to "requiring
the exercise of substantial discretion"); Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors:
Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 365, 376 (2004). Circular A-76 defines
commercial functions as:
Commercial Activities. A commercial activity is a recurring service that could be
performed by the private sector and is resourced, performed, and controlled by the
agency through performance by government personnel, a contract, or a fee-for-
service agreement. A commercial activity is not so intimately related to the public
interest as to mandate performance by government personnel. Commercial
activities may be found within, or throughout, organizations that perform
inherently governmental activities or classified work.
CIRCULAR A-76, supra note 202, at Attachment A, pt. B, § 2.
222. Circular A-76 and the reports are available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/index.html. In May 2004, OMB issued a report on competitive sourcing for the prior
year which indicated that agencies had completed 662 "competitive assessments" with a
net estimated savings of $1.1 billion (over three to five years) or about $12,000 per full-
time employee competed with a total cost avoidance of about fifteen percent.
COMPETITIVE SOURCING: REPORT ON COMPETITIVE SOURCING RESULTS FISCAL
YEAR 2003, at 2 (May 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/cs-omb-647-
report-final.pdf.
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Circular A-76 also recognizes limits on contracting out. It
describes certain nondelegable functions as "inherently
governmental" activities. These activities involve:
(1) Binding the United States to take or not to take some action
by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or
otherwise;
(2) Determining, protecting, and advancing economic, political,
territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic
action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract
management, or otherwise;
(3) Significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private
persons; or
(4) Exerting ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or
disposition of United States property (real or personal,
intangible), including establishing policies or procedures for the
collection, control, or disbursement of appropriated and other
federal funds. 23
The Circular incorporates the FAIR Act, which requires
agencies to submit annual inventories of agency-performed
commercial activities.224  The Circular also requires agencies
(including independent agencies) to identify all of their activities as
either commercial or inherently governmental.2 25  Agencies must
appoint a "competitive sourcing official" ("CSO") to centralize
agency oversight and to publish annual inventories of jobs eligible to
be contracted out.2
26
223. CIRCULAR A-76, supra note 202, at Attachment A, pt. B, § 1(a).
224. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 2(a), 112 Stat.
2382, 2382 (1998).
225. CIRCULAR A-76, supra note 202, at Attachment A, pt. A, § 1 ("An agency shall
prepare two annual inventories that categorize all activities performed by government
personnel as either commercial or inherently governmental.").
226. The agency lists appear in the Federal Register. E.g., 69 Fed. Reg. 30,341-02 (May
27, 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 3401-02 (Jan. 23, 2004). In its 2004 report, the GAO lists only
some agency contracting out data and it is from 2002. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-04-367, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: GREATER EMPHASIS NEEDED ON INCREASING
EFFICIENCY AND IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (2004) [hereinafter GAO COMPETITIVE
SOURCING], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04367.pdf.
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The Bush administration's goal is to contract out the jobs of
more federal civilian employees. 27  This push for privatization has
produced tensions with Congress over the effectiveness of private
sourcing, 2  and it has raised questions about the relationship of
government to the private sector, implicating the "constitutional
premises of our Government. ' 229 Interestingly, the push to outsource
in government comes at a time when the whole question of the
benefits of outsourcing is being challenged in the private sector.23 °
Thus, the Administration finds itself encouraging private sector
solutions when these solutions may be less tenable in private
management terms.
Outsourcing exercises a centrifugal force on the capacity of
government to oversee even properly contracted out jobs. The
shortage of government employees to oversee outsourced functions
produced by downsizing pushes government even further in the
direction of contracting out. As a practical matter, inherently
governmental functions, which were once thought to be over-
articulated,23' are now increasingly at risk.232 The concern is both with
the number and nature of jobs being contracted out. Indeed, private
contractors are even evaluating the performance of government
programs on which they may ultimately bid.233
227. In November 2002 President Bush announced that the White House intended to
let the private sector compete for 850,000 out of less than two million civil service jobs.
Guttman, supra note 215, at 330 & n.23 (citing Richard Stevenson, Government May Make
Private Nearly Half of Its Civilian Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at Al). See generally
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA 17-18 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf (committing the Administration to the cost saving
objectives met by competitive sourcing).
228. Guttman, supra note 215, at 332 n.33 (explaining that "[in the mid-1990s,
promised reforms led to congressional inquiries regarding hundreds of millions, even
billions, in actual or projected cost overruns on various M&O contracts" (citing DOE's
Fixed Price Cleanup Contracts: Why Are Costs Still Out of Control?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong.
27-28 (2000) (prepared statement of Gary Jones, GAO)).
229. Id. at 327.
230. See DELOiTrE CONSULTING, CALLING A CHANGE IN THE OUTSOURCING
MARKET 4 (2005) ("Instead of simplifying operations, outsourcing often introduces
complexity, increased cost and friction into the value chain .... ") [hereinafter DELOIITE
CONSULTING REPORT].
231. See Verkuil, supra note 21, at 8.
232. See discussion supra note 219 and accompanying text.
233. See Chris Strohm, TSA Examines Conflict of Interest Charges Against Contractor,
GOVEXEC.com, May 23, 2005, http://govexec.com/dailyfed/0505/052305cl.htm
(describing Lockheed Martin's contract with the Transportation Security Administration
to evaluate airport screening operations, some of which may be contracted out at a later
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As a legal matter, of course, government officials remain
responsible for overseeing the expenditure of public funds.2 ' But
when fewer and fewer federal officials are available to oversee more
and more private contractors,2 35 accountability and oversight are
bound to suffer. The legal responsibility is challenged when public
management is decreased in effectiveness. The issue is quality
control over supervision. By analogy to the Midcal doctrine, it takes
"active state supervision 236 to justify immunity from antitrust
liability; when public officials are stretched thin,237 the active (or
effective) predicate to supervision is lost.
But this problem is not with the formal requirements of Circular
A-76. It defines inherent government functions238 and tells agencies
to exempt them from contracting out. However, it may not protect
those functions from erroneous classifications. The agency's
designation of what is "inherent" is not subject to administrative
review. The procedural protections of Circular A-76 as well as the
FAIR Act 239 are directed instead at the competitive sourcing process.
If an agency erroneously designates a function as competitive when it
involves policymaking and decision control, review is limited. That
designation can only be challenged by an agency official who is
competing against a private contractor to save her job. These
procedures for internal review, and the obstacles to judicial review,
will be deferred until Part V.
date); see also infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text (discussing Rand Report on the
use of private contractors on the battlefield).
234. See Guttman, supra note 215, at 332-34.
235. See LIGHT, supra note 2, at 1 (providing numbers as of 1996).
236. See discussion supra notes 205, 213.
237. See discussion supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Contracting Out Procurement
Functions: "The Inherently Government Function" Exception, NASH & CIBINIC REPORT,
Sept. 2000, at 45 (analyzing the definition of "inherently governmental function" and its
application to the government's procurement activities).
239. The FAIR Act codified the pre-existing definition of "inherently governmental"
contained in Circular A-76 and the OFPP Policy Letter. OMB TRANSMITTAL
MEMORANDUM #20, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/aO76tm20
.html (explaining that "the FAIR Act codified the pre-existing requirement for agencies to
inventory their commercial activities, as well as the pre-existing definition of "inherently
governmental function"). 10 U.S.C. § 2464(b) (2000) dictates that the "performance of
workload needed to maintain a logistics capability [by DOD] may not be contracted for




1. Contracting Out and the Military
The Department of Defense ("DOD") is by far the largest
government contracting agency. While the procurement of
equipment (weapons systems, supplies, etc.) is a classic competitive
sourcing situation, the DOD has also become a large services
contractor. Today, fifty-seven percent of the Pentagon's procurement
dollars are spent on services, not equipment; services expenditures
increased by sixty-six percent from FY 1999 to FY 2003.240 Many of
these services potentially involve significant or inherent functions of
government, but they are only subject to Circular A-76 if they involve
competitive sourcing challenges.241
The war in Iraq has been either an outsourcing nightmare or
bonanza depending upon whether you are the government or a
private contractor.242 The war has posed enormous personnel and
deployment challenges for the military. War requires a capacity to
bring services on line quickly, which can be done only if the military
contracts some services to the private sector.243  This necessity,
however, brings management problems of the first order.24
There is an obvious need for the military to contract out
logistical or support services (food services, construction, etc.) to
private hands. The difficulty comes when these services include
military functions.2 45  The privatization of force raises special
problems for the public sector. The military has a monopoly on force,
but how can it ensure that when its power is delegated the private
exercise is circumscribed by public values and controls?246
One example is the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison
outside Baghdad. This debacle has an outsourcing dimension, as well
240. GAO REPORT ON IMPROVING SURVEILLANCE, supra note 3, at 1.
241. See discussion infra note 254.
242. To be fair, it can sometimes also be a nightmare for private contractors who bear
the brunt of poorly articulated contractual requirements that make them look bad in terms
of public opinion.
243. See Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, § 6 (Magazine),
at 29, 30 (placing the number of armed military contractors in Iraq at 25,000, the second
largest force after the U.S. military).
244. See DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
PRIVATIZING SECURITY 1 (2005) (noting that one in ten in Iraq is employed by private
security).
245. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILITARY INDUSTRY passim (2003) (documenting private military deployments in the
Balkans, Colombia, and Africa in addition to Iraq).
246. See AVANT, supra note 244, at 5-7.
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as a challenge to military discipline and command and control.247
When large contracts were issued to civilian organizations like CACI,
Inc. and Premier Technology Group, Inc. for "intelligence and
technical support, 24 8  private contractors were employed as
interrogators.249 In comparison, military translation services provided
by contractors like Titan Corp25 ° might well be "commercial" in the
Circular A-76 sense .2 1 By any measure, however, interrogation of
prisoners should qualify as an inherently governmental function.
Interrogation involves "military action and matters significantly
affecting life, liberty and property. '252  When interrogation leads to
prisoner abuse the result is an embarrassment for the military and its
civilian leadership.253 The Abu Ghraib abuses cannot be blamed
entirely on private contractors, of course. But once civilian
contractors assume military roles the public accountability function
becomes that much harder to achieve.
The public management question is how did these contracts
happen. Objections to interrogation contracts have not been raised
under DOD contracting rules or in the A-76 process. 4 Yet military
247. See Eric Schmitt, Abuse Panel Says Rules on Inmates Need Overhaul. Command
Chain Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al (summarizing the FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION
OPERATIONS (2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2004/d20040824final
report.pdf); see also Steven Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised
Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 549,
555-57 (2005) (discussing the problems caused by using contractor personnel).
248. See Shane Harris, Technology Contract Used to Purchase Interrogation Work,
GOVEXEC.com, May 20, 2004, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0504/052004hl.htm
(documenting CACI, Inc. and Premier Technology Group, Inc. contracts for "intelligence
advisors" and "intelligence and technical support").
249. The military has been investigating ten homicides at Iraqi detention centers
including at least one by a private contractor. See Bradley Graham, Army Investigates
Wider Iraq Offenses: Cases Include Deaths, Assaults Outside Prisons, WASH. POST, June
1, 2004, at Al. At Abu Ghraib, several of the challenged interrogators were private
contractors. Schmitt, supra note 247.
250. See Titan Competing with Northrup, L-3 To Keep Its Largest Contract,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 7, 2004, available at http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=10000103&sid=afR4zWgUnpDo&refer=us.
251. See supra note 221.
252. Id.
253. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in hearings before the Armed Services
Committees of the House and Senate on May 7, 2004, said: "These events occurred on my
watch as secretary of defense [sic.]. I am accountable for them. I take full responsibility."
Bradley Graham, Rumsfeld Takes Responsibility for Abuse: Defense Secretary Warns of
More Photos and Videos, WASH. POST, May 8, 2004, at Al. Secretary Rumsfeld also
alerted Committee members that "[tihere are a lot more photographs and videos that
exist. If these are released to the public, obviously it's going to make matters worse." Id.
254. There have been few challenges to the contracting out of military functions.
When the Army tried to bypass A-76 altogether and deny federal employees any
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privatization reveals gaps in oversight and control. Private
contractors are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
for any crimes they may have committed.255 While they are made
subject to other criminal statutes, 56  such as the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Reform Act,257 those controls are weak at
best. Statutory liability for the commission of criminal acts by
private contractors simply cannot replace effective public control. Of
course, this accountability gap exists whether contractors are
performing commercial or inherently governmental functions, but the
stakes are necessarily higher in the latter situation. The Iraq invasion
has put enormous pressure on the military resources of the United
States,259 and contracting out has made the problem worse. The
management problems privatization produces have long term
consequences.
The role of private military contractors expanded in Iraq without
a change in the law on private delegations. Under the FAIR Act,
private contractors can only provide "non-inherently governmental"
goods and services, but they cannot fill military positions, such as
those involving essential military skills or other skills necessary for
opportunity to retain their jobs (even if they could do them more cost-effectively), the
debate became whether or not agencies could waive the requirements of A-76. In only
one of those cases, dealing with a challenge to outsourcing army logistics jobs, was the
challenge brought under A-76 for contracting out "inherently governmental" functions.
See Federal Employees Union Appeals Decision to Outsource Logistics Jobs, 41 GOV'T
CONTRACTOR 275 (June 23, 1999).
255. The Uniform Code of Military Justice does not apply to civilians. See Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 279-80 (1960); United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 220-23 (2d Cir.
2000).
256. The Department of Justice has indicted a private contractor, employed by the
CIA, for beating a detainee in Iraq who later died. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Ariel
Hart, Contractor Indicted in Afghan Detainee's Beating; First Civilian Charged in Abuses-
the Prisoner Died the Next Day, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at Al. Other statutes that may
apply are the War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000); the Torture Act of 2000,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2340B (2000); and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
257. See Joseph R. Perlak, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000:
Implications for Contractor Personnel, 169 MIL. L. REV. 92, 95 (2001) (discussing the
ambiguity of the Act as it relates to contractors oversees).
258. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, for example, only applies to
civilians working for the DOD, not other federal agencies such as the CIA. See P.W.
Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International
Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 523-24 (2004) (discussing the difficulty of
regulating a private military firm).
259. Iraq presents many challenges to the military, not least of which is its failure to
meet recruiting targets, thereby increasing the pressure to contract out. See Thom
Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld Seeks Leaner Army, and a Full Term, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2005, at Al.
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career progression.2 60  Even though the Circular A-76 inherently
governmental function requirement, which tracks the FAIR Act, was
not changed in 2003,261 the use of military contractors in sensitive
roles seems to have increased. The line between military and
competitive functions has been blurred in a way that the laws have
not yet responded to.26  When private contractors are accused of
participating in acts of torture,263 there is a failure of public
responsibility. Torture is one governmental "function" that cannot be
privatized. 6
When many military contracting out decisions are single sourced
rather than competitively bid,265 oversight and financial control
problems are further exacerbated. Circular A-76 not only defines as
"inherently governmental" an activity that "significantly affects life,
liberty, or property of private persons, ' 26 6 it reflects a commitment to
competitive sourcing. If the A-76 process is not employed, this
potential check on military contracting is unavailable. This leaves
contracting to each military branches' internal control rules.
The results are revealing. The Department of the Army
reviewed its use of military contractors on the battlefield by
contracting out a report on the subject from the Rand Corporation.267
The Rand Report analyzed the Army Field Manual (#3-100) which
instructed military officers on how and when to hire private
contractors. The Report was designed to sharpen the Army's risk
260. See Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33
PUB. CONT. L.J. 369, 376-77 (2004).
261. See notes supra 221-23 and accompanying text.
262. This gap is potentially widened in Iraq by a June 2003 order that protects civilian
contractors from Iraqi prosecution. See Joanne Mariner, Private Contractors Who Torture,
FINDLAW.COM, May 10, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20040510.html;
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 17 (REVISED), STATUS OF THE
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, MNF-IRAQ, CERTAIN MISSIONS AND
PERSONNEL IN IRAQ (2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040627_CPAORD 17 Status of Coalition Rev with AnnexA.pdf ("Contractors
shall be immune from all Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them
pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract or any sub-contract thereto.").
263. See supra notes 248-49, 256 and accompanying text.
264. See The Torture Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000) (listing those individuals
covered by the Act).
265. See discussion supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
266. CIRCULAR A-76, supra note 202, at Attachment A, pt. B, § 1(a)(3).
267. FRANK CAMM & VICTORIA A. GREENFIELD, How SHOULD THE ARMY USE
CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD? ASSESSING COMPARATIVE RISK IN SOURCING




assessment procedures.2 6s It viewed the question in classic make-or-
buy transaction cost economics terms.269  The Report ignored the
larger question of whether the type of job being outsourced on the
battlefield was the kind that should not be contracted out under any
circumstances. When the DOD issued final rules on the use of
contractor personnel, it ignored this overriding issue.2 70
The military limits its inquiry to better accountability over an
accepted civilian contracting out process rather than (or in addition
to) a hard look at the delegations of inherent government functions.
The question of whether some government jobs-especially combat
ones-are not delegable at all is not even on the horizon. The irony
of the Rand Report should not be ignored. When the military has to
contract out the plan to deal with contracting out on the battlefield, it
is demonstrating how limited its "inherent" policy making resources
really are.271
2. The Public-Private Distinction and Airport Security
The experience with contracting out by the military makes it
appear that the momentum to privatize is largely unchecked. But
there is a counter example that must be considered: airport security
by the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"). This
example is made all the more salient by the fact that the TSA
replaced a private regime with public employees. The public-private
distinction still seems to have lessons to teach.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act became law on
November 19, 2001.272 Its passage was preceded by a contentious
debate over whether the airport security personnel (newly
reorganized in the TSA) should be public employees. The Senate
initially passed a bill unanimously that made these officials public
employees.273  Then the White House dropped its support and the
House of Representatives began to peel away Senate support.2 7 4
268. See id. at 125-28 (summarizing relevant risks in choosing between military or
private personnel).
269. See infra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
270. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Contractor Personnel
Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the United States, 70 Fed. Reg. 23,790 (May 5,
2005) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 207, 212, 225, and 252).
271. This is not a question of Rand having a programmatic conflict of interest. See
supra note 233 (discussing Lockheed Martin's TSA contract). However, as an intellectual
resource for the military, it seems to dominate the market for creative thought.
272. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110(2)(a), 115
Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
273. See 147 CONG. REC. S11,974-75 (remarks of Sen. Hollings) (2001).
274. Id.
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After much debate, Senators McCain and Hollings managed to
shepherd through a revised bill that the White House ultimately
supported."' 5 The final resolution was to make airport screeners
public employees, subject to an opt out by airport operators who
could, after November 19, 2004, show that employing private
screeners would be just as effective as employing public ones.276
The political battle was waged over the need for public
employees. 277  The prior screeners-the ones who were on duty on
9/11-had been private contractors for the airlines.27  The airlines
had sought to fulfill the screening function at the lowest possible cost,
which meant minimum wages for screeners.279 Since these screeners
were already private, they had to be brought into government.280 The
Republican distaste for increasing government employment (in this
case by 28,000) stymied the legislation until an opt out compromise
was accepted. 281 The White House also objected to providing airport
screeners with civil service protections and demanded the right to hire
and fire personnel.282
The arguments in favor of federal employees turned on the issue
of what functions should be inherently governmental. Proponents
275. Id.
276. § 110(2)(a), 115 Stat. 597, 614.
277. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S11,982 (remarks of Senator Rockefeller) ("We can no
longer allow the lives of our citizens to be placed into the hands of private companies.").
278. House Aviation Subcommittee Chairman John Mica "and other Republicans, who
were never entirely comfortable with creating a new bureaucracy, want to return all
airport security screener jobs to the private sector, where they were before Sept. I1, 2001."
Some in GOP Want Private Airport Screeners, USA TODAY, June 1, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2004-06-01-screenersx.htm (emphasis added).
279. See 147 CONG. REC. S11,978 (2001) ("Security is not something you can contract
out to the lowest bidder.") (remarks of Senator Hutchinson). The responsibilities of
airport screeners changed dramatically after 9/11 and they are now responsible for
performing limited law enforcement functions which make them much more of the public
sector than they were previously. Id.
280. In Professor Freeman's words, the issue became whether, after 9/11, screeners
should be "publicized." See Freeman, supra note 128, at 1286.
281. See, e.g., Press Release, Ari Fleischer, White House Office of Communications,
Federalization of Airport Workers (Nov. 6, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2001/11/20011106-8.html. The privatizing opt out is managed through regulations
established by the Department of Transportation. At this juncture there are five airports
participating in the opt out program: San Francisco, Kansas City, Greater Rochester,
Jackson Hole, and Tupelo airports. See Press Release, Transportation Security
Administration, Transportation Security Administration Awards Contracts for Private
Screening Pilot Programs at Kansas City, Rochester, NY, and Jackson Hole, WY Airports
(Oct. 10, 2005), http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?content=0900051980003736.
282. 147 CONG. REC. H8300-02 (2001); Talk of the Nation: Federalizing Airport
Screeners (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story?storylD=1132037.
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emphasized that since government was' responsible for security
functions (e.g., FBI, CIA, Border Patrol, and INS), Congress should
not privatize airport security because "[l]aw enforcement is a proper
function of the federal government. '283 While that proposition may
state matters too broadly (private security guards are sometimes
employed by government), it does highlight the essential role of
government when it comes to the use of force. The presence of a
badge, much like the requirement of an oath, 84 is an indicator of
government authority and control.
Of course, even with airport security the badge requirement is
not an absolute condition, since some airports were exempted from it
and others might be able to contract out of it. Still the TSA opt out
program had to be specifically exempted from OMB Circular A-76
since airport security would otherwise have been an inherently
governmental function.2 85  And the decision to opt out will not be
lightly made. Private opt outs require continuing TSA supervision
and must be made under the condition that the security of the
aviation system is and will always be an overriding concern.286 This
283. 147 CONG. REC. S11975 (2001) (remarks of Senator McCain).
284. See discussion supra notes 181-84.
285. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (defining inherent government
function).
286. It is also subject to criteria established by the Department of Transportation. 49
U.S.C.A. § 44920 (West Supp. 2005):
(a) In general ... an operator of an airport may submit to the Under Secretary an
application to have the screening of passengers and property at the airport under
section 44901 to be carried out by the screening personnel of a qualified private
screening company under a contract entered into with the Under Secretary ....
(c) Qualified private screening company.-A private screening company is
qualified to provide screening services at an airport under this section if the
company will only employ individuals to provide such services who meet all the
requirements of this chapter applicable to Federal Government personnel who
perform screening services at airports under this chapter ....
(d) Standards for private screening companies.-The Under Secretary may enter
into a contract with a private screening company to provide screening at an airport
under this section only if the Under Secretary determines and certifies to Congress
that-
(1) the level of screening services and protection provided at the airport under the
contract will be equal to or greater than the level that would be provided at the
airport by Federal Government personnel under this chapter; and
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congressional concern with oversight and control of privatized
security screener contracts supports the accountability theme and
promises continuing government involvement. In fact, to date
increased privatization of screeners has not progressed beyond the
five originally exempted airports.287
Whether the private opt out program will truly demand security
equivalency or will be done summarily by an Administration eager to
"evade headcount pressures 2 8 cannot be assured. But at least a
standard has been set for the TSA to administer. The agency appears
to be taking its responsibilities to evaluate the efficacy of public
control seriously.289 Congress has given the TSA public accountability
responsibilities that are missing in the military contractor situation.
The TSA and DOD both deal with serious security issues, but a
greater emphasis on the accountability of private contractors in the
military context might be expected. However, the evidence is to the
contrary. Congress, perhaps for separation of powers reasons, has
not resolved the accountability gaps in DOD privatizations as it has
with airport security through the TSA.
(2) the private screening company is owned and controlled by a citizen of the
United States, to the extent that the Under Secretary determines that there are
private screening companies owned and controlled by such citizens.
(e) Supervision of screened personnel.-The Under Secretary shall provide
Federal Government supervisors to oversee all screening at each airport at which
screening services are provided under this section and provide Federal
Government law enforcement officers at the airport pursuant to this chapter.
287. See supra note 281.
288. Then and Now: An Update on the Bush Administration's Competitive Sourcing
Initiative Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., the Fed. Workforce and the
Dist. of Columbia of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 168 (2003)
(testimony of Paul C. Light, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution) [hereinafter
Hearings], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108-
senate-hearings&docid=f:88936.wais.pdf. Even under the opt out program the TSA
continues to pay the salaries of the screeners, which are ultimately passed on to the air
traveling public. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44940(a) (West Supp. 2005).
289. The Lockheed Martin report to TSA notes that 99.5% of federal screeners passed
its recertification process. Strohm, supra note 233. However, the quality control checks of
airport security have not been all that reassuring. Eric Lipton, U.S. To Spend Billions
More To Alter Security Systems: Concerns About the Cost and Reliability of Equipment
Bought After 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at Al (noting among the items to be replaced
is "[plassenger-screening equipment at airports that auditors have found is no more likely
than before federal screeners took over to detect whether someone is trying to carry a
weapon or a bomb aboard a plane").
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IV. JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO PRIVATIZATION BY THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
The dangers that privatization poses to the governance function
can ultimately be framed in judicial terms. But constitutional
challenges face a variety of preclusionary doctrines unrelated to the
merits, especially as they relate to military functions. Statutory
challenges are potentially more available, though they have not been
effectively utilized to date. Whatever the likelihood of success on the
merits, however, the judiciary provides an important forum for
reform. Courts command attention, even if they do not provide all
the relief sought. In being forced to respond to the courts, the
executive branch investigates its own practices or can also set an
agenda for further action by the Congress.
A. Constitutional Claims
The paradigm privatization case at the constitutional level
involves executive branch delegation of inherent government
functions to private hands. Privatizing the work or duties of Officers
of the United States potentially contravenes the President's general
duty to exercise the executive power under Article If 9 ° and the
specific dictates of the Take Care clause.29' Moreover, Congress' role
in the appointment process, under the advise and consent function, is
also compromised. 92 Neither branch contemplates appointing and
confirming key government officials who permit the transfer of their
duties to private hands.
If the duties privately delegated are military functions, the
President's Commander in Chief power293 would be implicated. In
the military setting, privatization clearly challenges constitutional
limits when inherent government functions (matters involving life and
death and the exercise of discretion) are performed by private
security firms on the front lines in Iraq and elsewhere;2 94 these duties
are intended to be performed by Officers of the United States.295
290. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
291. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725, 1788-98 (1996) (reviewing the historical meaning of the Executive Power Clause,
Take Care Clause, and Opinions Clause).
292. See discussion supra notes 154, 177.
293. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
294. See discussion supra note 245 and accompanying text.
295. The President appoints all military officers, including second lieutenants, and the
Senate confirms them. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169 (1994) (holding that
all military officers are Officers of the United States); see also United States v. Perkins,
116 U.S. 483, 484 (1886) (cadet engineer appointed by Secretary of Navy).
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But threshold doctrines of standing and justiciability would be
obstacles to judicial intervention in the military context. 96 Judicial
intervention in wartime is carefully circumscribed.297 Indeed, in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld2 98 Justice O'Connor reminded us that "our
Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking
belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most
politically accountable for making them." '299 This sentence is a double
entendre in the privatization context: on the one hand it reaffirms the
nonjusticiability of military decisions, but on the other, it assumes that
the President and the military itself will make those decisions. Still, it
seems unlikely that the second meaning will trump the first.
In the civilian setting, constitutional challenges to the improper
delegation of executive power to private hands are less constrained by
justiciability issues.3" The use of private contractors is growing and
the higher up the policy ladder delegations go the more likely they
will encroach upon inherent governmental functions constitutionally
committed to officers of the United States.
Assuming the proper plaintiff (for example, a government
official whose job was privatized), an action based on the Due Process
Clause and the nondelegation doctrine could either restrain the
privatized delegation entirely or limit it until sufficient government
oversight or accountability is provided. While the reformulated due
process version of Carter CoaP1  moderates the traditional
296. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (holding that private parties "have
no standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the law"); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (holding that challenges to the Vietnam War are
nonjusticiable). The political question doctrine also has a role to play in the military
setting. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (refusing to subject the
"composition, training, equipping and control" of the National Guard to judicial review).
Whatever the present state of the doctrine, its application, if not revival, might be
expected in circumstances where military calls on the battlefield are sought to be second
guessed. See generally Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested
Criteria, 55 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
297. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050-51 (2001) (describing standards of
judicial review during wartime).
298. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
299. Id. at 600.
300. Of course, standing issues would still remain, and the plaintiffs would have to
allege injury to themselves. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (granting
taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures to parochial schools under the First
Amendment); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992) (raising
Article II objections to public law standing provisions).
301. Professor Merrill's exclusive delegation doctrine could also buttress the Carter
Coal approach. See discussion supra notes 135, 146 and accompanying text. It would still
require the Court to accept a shift in doctrine.
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nondelegation doctrine, it too proposes a doctrinal shift.30 2 Designing
an effective accountability standard for delegated activities
complicates the judicial role, but it is still far less constrained than in
the military context.
The larger Marbury question of whether some discretionary
functions are nondelegable depends upon the right case being found.
If the situation involves delegation of the functions of Officers of the
United States there is support under both Article I and II for
preventing it.303  But at this point Marbury itself would have to be
overcome since it postulates a category of policy decisions that are
beyond the reach of the courts.3 4  While there are such policy
decisions that would be justiciable despite Marbury,305 the actual
delegations will rarely be so clearly defined. Rather than delegate
duties per se, the usual situations involve delegation of functions over
which these constitutional officers remain nominally in charge. This
puts the judiciary in the awkward position of second guessing agency
decisions concerning workload, budget, and policy matters.306  The
use of outside contractors to help with the decisionmaking process is
an established administrative practice; curtailing it will require second
guessing that is usually disfavored by the courts. The initial lesson of
the Morgan cases,30 7 that "[tihe one who decides must hear,"3 8 must
be reviewed if the courts are to play a central role.30 9
302. Even under Carter Coal, delegations to private hands seem to require only a
formal set of oversight mechanisms which would likely be satisfied by the government
process that awards the contract, even if that process is questionably executed. See
discussion supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. In expressing these reservations,
however, I am no less respectful of the creative work Gillian Metzger has done to establish
constitutional standards for oversight of delegations. See Metzger, supra note 92, at 1422-
24.
303. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (discussing the oath requirement of
Webster v. Doe).
304. See discussion supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
305. Strauss, supra note 166, at 976-78 (discussing Marbury's limitations as a judicial
review tool).
306. Cf. Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (holding that an agency's
failure to act is not reviewable).
307. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
308. Id. at 481.
309. The final lesson of the Morgan cases is that "inquiry into the mental processes of
administrative decisionmakers is usually to be avoided." United States v. Morgan, 313
U.S. 409, 422 (1941); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 420 (1971) (stating that it is inappropriate to put administrators on the witness stand).
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B. Statutory Challenges
Statutes could provide a workable theory of judicial review,31°
even though the contracting out process has received little attention
from the courts. OMB's Circular A-76 process, which forbids the
delegation of inherent government functions, is potentially subject to
judicial review. However, Circular A-76 states that "[n]oncompliance
with this circular shall not be interpreted to create a substantive or
procedural basis to challenge agency action or inaction." '311 The
Circular has so far not provided a basis for judicial review.3 12 The
FAIR Act, which could provide a statutory basis for judicial review,
also has not yet been construed by the courts. Some commentators
have said it does not permit judicial review;313 still, section 3(b) of the
Act specifically provides for "interested party" standing at the
administrative level and the statute does not expressly bar judicial
review.1 Generalized judicial review provisions of the APA315 are
available,31 6 and prudential standing requirements normally support
public employees and the unions (as well as private contractors) as
within the "zone of interests" the FAIR Act seeks to protect.317
But judicial review has so far not been granted under the FAIR
Act to claims of federal employees, 318 even though disappointed
310. After all, even under Heckler, the concurring Justices reserved reviewability for
"abdication of statutory responsibilities." Heckler, 470 U.S. at 853 (Marshall, J.,
concurring), In our situation, the failure to act would amount to an agency refusing to
enforce the inherent government function requirement of Circular A-76 or the FAIR Act.
311. See CIRCULAR A-76, supra note 202, at 3.
312. See Courtney v. Smith, 2002 FED App. 0248P, P16, 297 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir.)
(holding Circular A-76 does not provide standing because it is not a law and stating that
"[t]his limitation suggests that the internal administrative appeals process ... is intended
to be the sole basis for challenging agency action that allegedly violates the Circular").
313. See Robert H. Shriver III, No Seat at the Table: Flawed Contracting Out Process
Unfairly Limits Front-Line Federal Employee Participation, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 613, 621
(2001).
314. The Senate's Committee on Governmental Affairs' report accompanying the
FAIR Act indicates, however, that "any challenges to the inventory list [are] to be
resolved solely at the agency level by the agency." S. REP. No. 105-269, at 9 (1998).
315. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). See generally PIERCE, SHAPIRO, & VERKUIL, supra note
18, § 5.3 (summarizing judicial review provisions of the APA and relevant decisions).
316. See, e.g., Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
488-89 (1998) (holding the "zone of interests" test for prudential standing does not
require courts to "inquire whether there has been a congressional intent to benefit the
would-be plaintiff").
317. See Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Pena, No. 95-3016, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8258, at *14 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 1996) (unpublished opinion) (granting standing to
challenge related actions under the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
Amendments of 1979).
318. Federal employees performing non-inherent government functions have not been
able to challenge procurement actions. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Babbitt, 46
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private contractors can challenge government procurement actions.
The Federal Circuit has effectively closed the door to employee
judicial challenges by holding that the Government Accountability
Office's ("GAO's") interpretation of "interested person" should
control.319 Congressional action to provide statutory standing for
employees before the Court of Claims would be opposed by the
Administration.32 ° This leaves contractors themselves the most likely
candidates to achieve judicial review and makes such review
dependent upon the government denying rather than granting a
request to privatize a government function.
But even if standing were achieved by employees, judicial review
might be of limited value. The scope of review would be limited to
arbitrary and capricious actions.321 Under this standard, courts would
be reluctant to rule on the substance of government delegations of
functions to the private sector. As to the competitive sourcing
process itself, the courts have limited tools with which to perform this
task. The key question on substantive review would be what is an
inherent government function. While the FAIR Act and Circular A-
76 provide definitions, the judiciary would find itself embroiled in the
workings of the contracting out process. This places the courts in an
awkward oversight role. One is reminded of the difficulties the courts
have had in deciding what a public function is for state action
purposes.322 Instead of serious substantive review, the courts would
likely settle for review of the procedures employed at the
administrative level.323
The question of what is an inherent government function might
draw closer scrutiny, especially if the agency procedures were
Fed. App'x 254, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that civil employees who lost
their jobs at air force bases lacked prudential standing under the APA).
319. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (affirming a Court of Claims denial of employee standing under relevant
statutes). Since the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over bid protests, the
Federal Circuit's word is final.
320. The GAO would likely oppose such an amendment since it sees judicial review of
the A-76 process as potentially dilatory and expensive (attorney fees, etc.). See
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVING THE
SOURCING DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT: FINAL REPORT 89 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/a76panel/dcap0201.pdf [hereinafter COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
PANEL] (describing costs of litigation related to challenges of Circular A-76 decisions).
321. See PIERCE, SHAPIRO, & VERKUIL, supra note 18, § 7.3.2 (explaining that
arbitrary and capricious is the default standard of administrative review and is the most
deferential to agencies).
322. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
323. This is a course the courts have pursued on judicial review of informal rulemaking,
for example, See PIERCE, SHAPIRO, & VERKUIL, supra note 18, § 6.4.6.
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deficient in defining it. Since the outsourcing of these functions
clearly violates the statute, a legal standard would have to be
developed. This effort raises in statutory guise the underlying
constitutional issue of nondelegable functions. Assuming a proper
plaintiff (either a disappointed contractor or a government official),
the courts cannot ignore the statutory formulation.
The relationship between the contracting out process and the
Subdelegation Act should also receive closer study judicially. The
Subdelegation Act, which permits delegations only to federal officials
unless Congress specifies otherwise,324 is a potential barrier to
delegations to private parties.325 In the contracting out situation there
are two controlling standards-the FAIR Act which requires agencies
to designate inherent government functions and the Circular A-76
process which drives the public-private competition over competitive
sourcing. The FAIR Act might satisfy the Subdelegation Act's
requirement for statutory delegation, but the A-76 process clearly
would not (indeed, as a Circular, it does not even have the status of
an Executive Order).
The key issue is the choice agencies make under the FAIR Act to
declare certain government functions eligible for contracting out.
This choice is legislatively required and ties into the Subdelegation
Act's requirement that delegations be limited to Officers of the
United States. It would have to be demonstrated that Congress was
aware of the Subdelegation Act effect of the FAIR Act. The
Department of Justice would be expected to argue the affirmative,
but Congress's awareness of the Subdelegation Act's connection to
privatization might be hard to show. The relationship of the FAIR
Act to the Subdelegation Act and to privatization of government
functions, if framed judicially, would test Congress's purpose. The
pro-government official bias of the Subdelegation Act shows that
Congress intended to act cautiously in this area.326 This makes the
Subdelegation Act the best available tool for judicially restraining the
privatization of inherent government functions.
324. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
325. Cf. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (preventing
delegation to state officials under the Subdelegation Act).
326. The pro-government delegatee bias of the Subdelegation Act (passed in the
1950s) reflects a time before wholesale privatizing was contemplated or endorsed. See
discussion supra note 158. The Act seems anachronistic now in that regard, but its




V. ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES TO PRIVATIZATION OF
INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
Much of this Article has been devoted to understanding and
developing legal theories to constrain government from placing in
private hands functions that are significant, discretionary, or
"inherently governmental." These theories may take time to realize
since they are tested on the extension of judicial precedents that have
to be refocused to meet the challenges of privatization. The most
effective immediate approaches may well be political or
administrative. The agencies themselves-such as the DOD, OMB,
and GAO-can be the best place to seek enforcement of statutory
requirements. The administrative structure, with congressional
support, has to make the first efforts at effecting change in this
contentious area.327
A. Economic and Political Considerations Involving Inherent
Government Functions
Circular A-76, the FAIR Act, and the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act have one thing in common-they all ask
the crucial question of whether to privatize functions that are
arguably inherently governmental. This is a political question that
implicates the doctrine of separation of powers. But it is also an
economic question with practical dimensions. At one level,
government entities are no different from private corporations when
they decide to contract out functions formerly performed in-house.3 28
In business as well as government, contracting out is a classic
make-or-buy decision. It can be analyzed in terms of transaction cost
economics, as Professor Oliver Williamson has done.329  If the
outsourced transaction costs less than the in-house alternative,
resources will be best utilized if they support this choice, whether they
are private or government. Admittedly, the decision worlds are quite
different, and as Professor Shapiro suggests, contracting out (the
"buy" rather than "make" decision) is made more costly with
327. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 121-23
(2005) (arguing for a greater role of the executive rather than the courts in controlling
private enforcement).
328. In this connection, the Deloitte Consulting report, questioning the value of
outsourcing to the private sector, strikes a cautionary note for government as well.
DELOITrE CONSULTING REPORT, supra note 230, at 2. If outsourcing is failing as a
business concept, it can no longer be embraced as a principle of government management.
329. See Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 319-26 (1999).
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incomplete contracts that invite opportunistic behavior and hold-up
problems.33 ° Government contracts in the Iraq setting have struggled
to define the services to be provided under contracts that are open-
ended, incomplete, and single sourced.331
When the government contracting out process involves inherent
government functions, however, a new magnitude of complexity
arises. These contracts cannot be viewed solely through the lens of
transaction cost analysis. The appropriate roles of the public and
private sector raise questions beyond efficiency concerns. The debate
over airport security questioned the purpose of government control.
The social value of the badge, and its relationship to public
acceptance of security goals were seen as normative questions. Oath-
taking factors into the efficiency of a government official's
performance; that performance cannot be measured solely on an
efficiency basis. The airport security debate demonstrates that the
tension between competitive sourcing and inherent government
functions is more political than economic. Privatized activities
determined by the A-76 process are supposed to save the government
money,332 but the key inquiries remain political and legal.
Under the Bush administration, government has grown on a
GDP basis even as the number of government employees has been
reduced.333 The political dimension of contracting out in the airport
security context had to do with headcounts, not cost. Republicans
generally favor contracting out in order to constrain the largely
Democrat, unionized base of government employees.334 Thus the
politics of contracting out includes the assumed voting preferences of
government employees. But both sides have political grievances.
Democrats are entitled to complain that private firms who benefit
330. Professor Shapiro has expanded the transaction cost analysis to contracting out in
important ways. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE
L.J. 389, 391 (2003).
331. See discussion supra note 217 and accompanying text.
332. This was not true in connection with airport security since the TSA employees are
funded by an airport tax on passengers, whether or not the officials are public or private.
See Airport Security Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 44940(a) (West Supp. 2005).
333. See Norris, supra note 120, at C1 (stating that under President Bush "17.4 percent
of all wage and salary payments came directly from the government" versus sixteen
percent under President Clinton); see also David Brooks, How to Reinvent the G.O.P.,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 30, 32-35 (explaining how Republicans
abandoned the ideal of small government).
334. But contracting out also has bipartisan roots which go back to the reinventing
government movement sponsored by the Clinton-Gore administration. To some extent,
those earlier successes have led to the present crisis over adequate numbers of




from contracting out are likely to be Republican campaign
contributors.335
These political battles ultimately become stalemated. Political
analysis at a higher level might accept the notion that public functions
are part of public administration, if not public law. The political role,
like the economic one, assesses the value of government involvement
independently. Government has the duty to protect inherent
government functions, both politically and constitutionally, under
either political party. The task of the administrative process is to help
make this calculation fairly and accurately.
B. Challenging Outsourcing Determinations
Inherent government functions ("IGFs") are elusive concepts;
they are best articulated by the administrative process. Agency
actions make the initial IGF decisions and appellate administrative
proceedings evaluate these agency recommendations. Challenges to
agency IGF decisions on administrative review are limited in several
ways, including administrative standing rules. Under the Circular A-
76 process, agencies, which are required to post competitive positions
on a biannual basis, make the initial determination whether a
function is an IGF or whether it is eligible for competitive sourcing.
This first cut is rarely subject to independent administrative review.336
Of course, the competitive sourcing decision is challengeable within
335. See Outsourcing: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Military Readiness of the H.
Comm. on Armed Services, 107th Cong. 22 (2002) (statement of Bobby L. Harnage,
National President of the American Federation of Government Employees), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has177030.O00/has177030_Of.htm
(lamenting the cronyism and political aspects of contracting out). The "pork barrel"
aspects of competitive sourcing are bipartisan. Steven L. Schooner explained that "both
executive and legislative branch pressure prompted the reduction in the size of the federal
bureaucracy" and that "[b]oth political parties reveled in, and claim[ed] credit for having
contributed to, the reduction in size of the Federal Government." Steven L. Schooner,
Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail than Rudder?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 284-86
(2004). Schooner concludes:
During the government downsizing frenzy of the 1990s ... agencies routinely
deemed their acquisition professionals nonessential to their core missions.
Accordingly, buyers, auditors, contract specialists, and quality assurance personnel
were jettisoned in waves at [severe] rates .... Only after the fact did senior
leadership concede the stark ramifications of the acquisition workforce purge.
Id. at 284-85.
336. Oversight agencies include the GAO which can be a potential ally in defining and
perhaps protecting IGFs from ill-considered elimination. But it is doubtful that GAO sees
its role as independently determining the public interest in public employment. So far,
judicial review has not second guessed any of these decisions. See discussion infra note
345 and accompanying text.
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the agency. Eligible objectors are either private contractors seeking
to expand the competitive sourcing side of the equation or
government employees (often represented by their union, the
American Federation of Government Employees ("AFGE")) who
are trying to protect these jobs from competition.
In general, this is how the competitive sourcing process works.
Agencies (such as DOD) are required to post two annual inventories
categorizing functions as commercial or inherently governmental.
This is done by publishing lists of qualifying jobs.337 OMB reviews
these lists and, after translating the personnel codes into job
descriptions, makes judgments about their adequacy. But OMB does
not mount effective challenges to agency IGF decisions; it has neither
the personnel nor incentive to do so."' Thus the initial agency IGF
decision goes largely unreviewed-the focus is on competitive
sourcing instead.
The agency's initial decision to designate jobs for competitive
sourcing sets up a public-private competition. The private firms and
the affected officials make presentations before the agency to
establish which one is more efficient. Government officials do quite
well in these contests. 3 9 Their success is based on a preestablished
public-private cost comparison that requires private challengers to
achieve at least a ten percent cost differential over in-house costs to
prevail.340
Revised Circular A-76 gives standing to a "directly interested
party" to contest aspects of the process on appeal to the agency.341
Parties include both private sector offerors who contest a failure to
designate a job or function as private (or to select them as more
competitive) and a representative of those federal employees directly
337. Unfortunately, these lists are produced in the form of personnel codes, which are
incomprehensible to the general reader. With 700 functional codes and twenty-three
major categories, "[algencies [have] reported difficulty in classifying positions as
inherently governmental or commercial and in applying guidance to categorize activities."
GAO COMPETITIVE SOURCING, supra note 226, at 3.
338. After all, it is OMB that is pushing the contracting out question on the agencies in
the first place.
339. It is estimated that government officials prevail in fifty percent of the competitive
sourcing challenges. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 320, at 19-20
(documenting twenty-two A-76 comparison protests reviewed by GAO since 1999, eleven.
of which were "sustained" (sent back) to the agency for failure to follow statutes or
regulations).
340. Id. at 19.
341. CIRCULAR A-76, supra note 202, at B-17.
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affected by the decision to designate a public job as private.342 But
the right to appeal beyond the agency stage to GAO is presently
limited to private sector challengers.3 43  The FAIR Act, which
controls competitive challenges before DOD, has a broader standing
provision. It provides an administrative appeals process that allows
any "interested party" to challenge DOD's decision to classify a list of
activities as commercial or inherently governmental.3" This would
presumably include government officials or their representatives as
well. Under the Act, the initial privatization lists are also required to
be made available for public inspection and can be subject to
challenge during the initial decision period. The IGF/competitive
sourcing decision receives a broader airing, assuming an objector can
meet the administrative standing ("interested person") requirement.
Judicial review, however, is not provided for in the FAIR Act and is
not supported by the relevant legislative history.345
1. The Lessons of the Seafood Inspector Challenge
While both Circular A-76 and the FAIR Act permit
administrative challenges to the agencies' initial designations, so far
few challenges to that decision (as opposed to competitive sourcing
decisions) have been successful.3 46  One that has, however, offers
some valuable lessons. The agency involved, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), made an initial
decision to list the function of seafood inspector as commercial rather
342. The revised Circular limits the public objector to a single individual rather than
multiple objecting "federal employees (or their representatives)." CIRCULAR A-76, supra
note 202, at F-5. Circular A-76 Attachment D defines a "Directly Interested Party" as an
"agency tender official who submitted the agency tender; a single individual appointed by
a majority of directly affected employees as their agent; a private sector offeror; or the
official who certifies the public reimbursable tender." Circular A-76, supra note 202, at D-
4. See discussion infra note 363 (defining "agency tender official").
343. The challenge must first be to an agency appeal board and then, if it is a private
challenge, either to GAO or the Federal Court of Claims. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES
PANEL, supra note 320, at 19; see also id. at 19-20 (documenting that since 1999, of 22 A-
76 protests, GAO sustained eleven and denied eleven).
344. Federal Activities Inventory Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382
(codified at note following 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2000)).
345. While the Senate report suggests that challenges are too limited at the
administrative stage, it does not contemplate judicial review. In Senate Report No. 269,
the Committee on Governmental Affairs stated that it "intend[ed] for any challenges to
the inventory list to be resolved solely at the agency level by the agency." S. REP. No.
105-269, at 9 (1998); see discussion on judicial review supra notes 320-21 and
accompanying text.
346. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 320, at 19 (documenting that,
of 101 DOD appeals during FY 1997-2001, six successfully challenged cost comparison
decisions).
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than as an IGF. The result was to make the jobs of seafood
inspectors eligible for competitive sourcing. This choice was
challenged before the agency by the program inspectors themselves.347
The inspectors argued that their role as public officials was not a
competitive one and could not be played by private contractors.
3 48
Government employment provided inspectors with credibility, they
maintained, which was a quality that had an independent value,
especially in the international market.3 49 This value was touted as not
just symbolic but also economic. The evidence presented showed that
if the inspectors were not viewed as authoritative by foreign
governments-especially by China and the European Union-
shipments of United States fish to those countries could be
jeopardized.350 Foreign governments, it seems, place an independent
value on the presence of a "badge" in the inspection process.
The seafood inspectors ultimately gained assistance from
Members of Congress"' and had the designation reversed on appeal
by the Department of Commerce (the agency to which NOAA
reports).352 Ironically, the private sector-the fishing industry-also
saw the value of continued "publicization" of the inspector program.
Even though the program was entirely paid for by their fees,353 the
fishing industry decided it got more value (in terms of inspector
credibility) from continued public control of the process. The
Department's support for public control was painless, since no
appropriated funds were at issue, which was also the case with airport
security.
The lesson of the seafood inspectors program should not be lost;
the requirement of official authority (a badge, if you will) convinced
all sides of the debate that public control was needed. A similar
argument applies to other federal jobs where the badge or oath
matters, such as airport inspectors, prison guards, and especially
military personnel. The equation of seafood inspectors with security
personnel can be legitimated because the interests at stake are
347. See James McCullough et al., Feature Comment, Year 2003 OMB Circular A-76




351. In the seafood inspector situation, thirty-nine members of Congress expressed
their strong opposition to the commercial designation. Id.
352. See generally Letter from Richard V. Cano, Acting Director of Seafood Inspection
Program, to Otto J. Wolff, C.F.O., U.S. Department of Commerce (June 3, 2003) (on file
with author).
353. Id. at 1.
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comparable. Security of seafood is a public health issue as is the well-
being of those who travel.
Finally, the willingness of Congress to intervene in what might
seem to be a minor matter demonstrates how crucial its role can be to
a proper resolution.354 The politics are more complicated when the
inquiry shifts to the security or military sector, but the same concerns
apply. In all these settings, the make-or-buy decision for government
often places the badge and the oath on the scales in weighing whether
a public or private provider is more efficient.
C. The Crucial Role of GAO
A potential administrative ally in defending public functions of
government is the Comptroller General and the agency he heads:
GAO. GAO is not part of the executive branch;355 it must investigate
matters brought to its attention by members of Congress, whether on
the majority or minority side.356 This mandate places GAO in a
position to consider the government-wide implications of the
contracting out process.
GAO has bid protest authority under the Competition in
Contracting Act ("CICA").357  But GAO's scope of review is
limited-it will not review the merits of the competitive source/IGF
decision (which it views as a matter of executive branch policy).358
GAO's role is to determine whether an agency properly followed the
procedural requirements of Circular A-76.359 Under CICA, protests
may be brought by actual or prospective bidders, who are invariably
private contractors. 360 This restriction has led GAO to dismiss
protests by federal employees and their unions for lack of
354. Of course, the pressures on Congress, when major military contractors like
Lockheed Martin are on the other side, must also be acknowledged. See supra notes 233,
289.
355. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730-32 (1986) (discussing the congressional
role of the Comptroller General and GAO).
356. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 719 (2000) (explaining the requirements of Comptroller
General reports); id. §§ 711-720 (2000 & Supp. I 2002) (describing the "General Duties
and Powers" of GAO).
357. Competition in Contracting Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (codified
at 31 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000)).
358. See COMMERCIAL AcTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 320, at 19-20 (describing
GAO's role in the contracting out process).
359. See Jayna Richardson, Comment, Outsourcing and OMB Circular A-76: Sixth
Circuit Opens the Door to Federal Employee Challenges of Agency Determinations, 28
PUB. CONT. L.J. 203,212 (1999).
360. 31 U.S.C. § 3551(2) (2000). In the last three years, more than fifty private protests
have been filed challenging A-76 competitions. Admin. Practice and Procedure Notice, 68
Fed. Reg. 35,411 (June 13, 2003).
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administrative standing because they were not "offerors" under
CICA.361
By so restricting administrative standing, GAO has unnecessarily
imbalanced the administrative appeals process. If only those
challenging the agencies' failure to contract out can object, the
appeals process creates a one-way ratchet in favor of privatization.362
However, GAO appears to be relaxing its position on public entity
standing in Circular A-76 challenges. 63 Its interest in the question
has undoubtedly been heightened by congressional pressures;3 " still,
the outcome better serves the public purposes of the privatization
process.
GAO is now an "accountability" office in name365 as well as in
mission so its role in the privatization process could not be more
appropriate, since public accountability is at stake. The Comptroller
General has committed GAO to providing "Congress with
professional, objective, fact-based, non-partisan and non-ideological
information. 3 66 This commitment helps assure careful and balanced
decisions which GAO encourages through its latest standing
proposal.367
GAO is the agency most likely to represent the public interest in
reviewing the contracting out process and preserving the public-
private distinction. The only other candidate for this role is OMB,
but, as an executive branch agency, it has an interest in seeing the
Administration's privatization process succeed. In the words of Paul
Light, what is needed is an entity that can view competitive sourcing
361. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, B-282904.2, 2000 CPC # 87 (June 7,
2000), available at http://strategicsourcing.navy.mil/reference-documents/American%20
Federation %20of%20Government%20Employees.pdf.
362. This means that erroneous agency decisions to contract out IGFs rather than
competitive sources cannot be detected through an appeals process.
363. GAO has sought comments on changes in "interested party" status in connection
with A-76 protests. See 45 GC #244 (May 2003). It has recently proposed a rule to
provide an "agency tender official" with the status to appeal on behalf of public
employees. See Bid Protest Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,878 (Dec. 20, 2004) (to be
codified at 4 C.F.R. pt. 21). It still denies unions the right to appeal. Id.
364. The Senate introduced a bill that would amend the CICA that would provide
federal employees with bid protest rights. S. 2438, 108th Cong. (2004).
365. GAO's name was changed from the Government Accounting Office on July 7,
2004. 31 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West Supp. 2005).
366. See David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: What's in a Name?, ROLL
CALL, July 19, 2004, 2004 WLNR 4024409.
367. See discussion supra note 342 (concerning standing for agency tender officials to
represent government employees whose jobs are proposed to be outsourced). The
proposal also talks about employees being entitled to representation by someone selected
by a majority of them, which seems more difficult to administer. See supra note 363.
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issues as meant not only to "protect the private sector from
government" but also to "protect civil society from the private
sector."
3 68
GAO is well known for improving agency performance. A good
example is its recent work on identifying organizational conflicts of
interest.360 In this era of rampant contracting out, many organizations
have potential conflicts in deciding who gets contracts. The problem
is exacerbated when general performance contracts are involved, as
they are in Iraq.37 The problem of conflicts involves both private and
public sector competitors.371 GAO is in the best position to conduct
these conflict reviews since it is as nonpolitical and respected as one
can expect a government agency to be.
GAO should also look more carefully at agency IGF decisions,
which precede and frame the A-76 competitions. To date, it has been
unwilling to take positions on what it sees as the political question of
inherent functions. But it could review these agency decisions
without having to reverse them. Collecting agency decisions could
lead to the creation of a "common law" of IGF decisions. Once data
are collected, "grey area" IGF decisions could be identified.3 72 By
sharing this information with other agencies, GAO would produce a
better picture of how agencies decide to delegate functions of
government to private parties, which is still an unilluminated aspect
of the contracting out process.
D. Structuring a Viable Administrative Review Process
When public employees (if not their unions) ultimately gain
administrative standing as interested persons under Circular A-76 and
the FAIR Act, the appeals process will be more balanced. The
quality of the review then becomes the focus of attention. GAO
helps ensure decisional regularity where procedures are in short
supply. It remands decisions to agencies for further review where the
368. Hearings, supra note 288, at 161.
369. See Daniel I. Gordon, Organizational Conflicts of Interest: A Growing Integrity
Challenge 7-15 (Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 127, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=665274. Mr. Gordon is
managing associate general counsel of GAO.
370. One example involves a contract awarded to CAC, Inc., for interrogation service,
where one of its officials was involved in writing the statement of work. See id. at 3.
371. See id. at 7-8.
372. The U.S. Army's FAIR Act website allows for the review of its decisions in this
regard. See http://web.lmi.org/fairnet/select.cfm.
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initial effort was factually deficient.373 But GAO is not in the
policymaking business, and its role is limited. Congress will have to
change the substantive standards. Gauging the interest of Congress
in this effort is difficult, but the pendulum may be swinging behind
the public values side of the debate. Professor Minow has pointed
towards a "dilution of public values" as an unintended consequence
of privatization that should increasingly worry Congress.374 GAO's
role in illuminating privatization choices-while still not choosing to
make them itself-could help strengthen congressional interest. The
possibility of future activity can be glimpsed from the congressional
role in encouraging the Department of Commerce to reverse the
seafood inspector status from private to public.375
Under the present structure, federal employees, their unions, and
private contractors represent the "public interest." Affected
employees have the most knowledge about the nature of their jobs
and how competitive or inherently governmental they might be. But
they and their unions are primarily concerned about job protection,
which compromises their ability to serve the public's interest. Private
firms of course have equally conflicted views. To some extent, at the
administrative level, the disinterested public interest (if not taken up
by GAO) is left out of the equation. In this context, the public
interest should ensure that inherent government functions are not
inadvertently privatized during the outsourcing process.
Groups who speak for accountable government, such as the
National Academy of Public Administration, the Brookings
Institution, or the American Enterprise Institute, could play a role in
this regard. They would not have administrative standing to ensure
that IGF decisions are made properly in the first instance, but they
could wield power after the fact by commenting on the propriety of
those decisions. Agencies would benefit from more objective views
on the constitutional imperatives behind government functions.
More articulated views about inherent government functions and
how to protect them might emerge from exchanges between agencies
and these outside groups. Then the process for commenting on
agency IGF decisions could be regularized by employing procedures
associated with notice and comment rulemaking, which would make
373. GAO has sustained challenges on cost comparison decisions in fifty percent of
cases between 1999 and 2002. See COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, supra note 320, at
19-20.
374. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (2003).
375. See discussion supra Part V.B.1.
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the review process more open and effective.376 These ideas require no
statutory changes.377 They require only the will to hear all sides and
to recognize the constitutional significance of the inherent
government function decision.
E. The Relevance of Civil Service Reforms
An issue that keeps recurring is the capacity of government
officials to oversee private contractors. Oversight is essential for
outsourcing to work, yet, as privatization proceeds, the number of
"overseeing" officials in the SES is thinning out.37 s Cutbacks in
personnel below the SES level also threaten the residual capacity of
government to ensure that its contracts are properly enforced. These
developments raise the more general question of the continued
vitality of the civil service. This is not the place for an extended
discussion of the civil service or its reform. But the professional
future of government depends upon a strong civil service.
Retirements in the face of new demands for oversight of privatized
activities only widen the leadership gap. And service overregulation
can be one of the incentives for privatization. Agencies often feel that
to get the talent they need quickly and cost effectively, they must go
outside government; this is true for the military.379
Government officials often feel that they have more control over
private contractors than they do over their own employees due to
restrictions on hiring or firing permanent employees.8  The
legislative compromise on airport security shows how civil service
rules can affect public management adversely. The Transportation
Security Act only became law when rules restricting hiring and firing
376. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) (describing the opportunity interested persons have
to participate in the rulemaking process after notice of a proposed rule is published in the
Federal Register). The notice periods could be shortened and comments could be
submitted in written form. Since these are personnel matters not subject to § 553
requirements in the first place, the use of expedited procedures would be entirely proper.
377. If statutory change were contemplated, it should revise the A-76 process to ensure
agency consideration of inherent government functions and OMB consideration of the
"accountability gap" that is emerging government-side when top officials (i.e., SES level)
are replaced or stretched too thin.
378. The Senior Executive Service has about 6,000 career positions, forty-six percent of
which are eligible for retirement (including early out). See THE FACT BOOK, supra note
1, at 75. In 1990, there were approximately 6,800 career SES positions. Id. at 76.
379. See SINGER, supra note 245, passim (documenting private military deployments in
the Balkans, Columbia, Africa, and Iraq).
380. It stands to reason that, given an alternative, government officials might prefer
obedient and enthusiastic private contractors to entrenched and often disinterested civil
servants.
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personnel were suspended 381  But the need for public sector
employees at TSA was accepted despite these difficulties. To some
extent, civil service "deregulation" can help to encourage government
to outsource only those functions that could be classified as
competitive rather than inherently governmental.382 It is the latter
category that must be protected from privatization in order for
government to fulfill its responsibilities to the public.383
Paul Volcker has long been a champion of freeing the public
service from constraints that limit and often frustrate the mission of
government officials.3" His message has gone unheeded during the
era of privatization, but the times and needs are different after 9/11.
The phrase "I'm from the government and I want to help you" no
longer draws instant applause and derisive laughter. Avoidance of
the delegation of inherent government functions to the private sector
can happen more readily in a world where civil service rules and
standards make government service more attractive to the kind of
talent that now appears on the rosters of private contractors.385
Moving some of these talented and dedicated people back into
government (or attracting them in the first place) has to be a major
goal of reform for the civil service.
VI. CONNECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article has sought to connect the public-private distinction
to the essential question of who runs the government and for what
reasons. There is a long historical, political, and legal tradition that
supports this distinction and its role in our society. It is at the core of
those functions of government that are labeled "inherent." These
functions are performed by officials who exercise discretion and are
accountable for the important actions of government. The
privatization movement's success has placed these functions and the
actors who perform them increasingly at risk. Protecting the public
381. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
382. See Dilulio, supra note 121, at 1284 (arguing that government by proxy (private
actors) needs a "framework of accountability" (quoting Minow, supra note 374, at 1267).
383. See Dilulio, supra note 112, at 28 (advocating "an organizational culture of
performance rather than of security").
384. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA:
REBUILDING THE PUBLIC SERVICE 29-30 (1989) (recommending changes in civil service
requirements for living, etc.); see also GOODSELL, supra note 111, at 42-58 (defending
bureaucracy against various negative "myths").
385. In the military setting, the inability to re-sign experienced soldiers has reached
crisis proportions. See Bergner, supra note 243, at 33-34 (documenting the bonuses paid
to military officials in Iraq).
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sector means placing some functions beyond the reach of
privatization.
Giving the public sector an independent value does not
undermine the private sector. This is not a zero sum game. Indeed,
in terms of democratic theory this is a positive sum game where both
sides can win. 86 If the public sector is given independent value, the
private sector benefits from clearer rules and better oversight. Our
tradition of political liberalism keeps the public sector from usurping
the essential role of private enterprise. But our notions of civil
society require that the public enterprise operate effectively as well.
It is difficult for the courts to implement the public-private
distinction under the Constitution. Carter Coal's concern with due
process and private delegations is one method; some limitations on
delegations by high government officials under Marbury could be
another. As a statutory matter, the Subdelegation Act is an intriguing
proposition. It has the potential to limit government delegations and
to make Congress think twice about transferring control of important
government activities to private hands. Judicial intervention can
often provide the prod, even if it will not provide the solution.
The various statutory and administrative alternatives under the
FAIR Act and Circular A-76 have not realized their public law
potential. The FAIR Act honors the public-private distinction by
defining inherent government functions; Circular A-76 sets up a
competitive process that allows government employees to challenge
rampant privatization. If Congress replaces Circular A-76 with a
better defined statute that guarantees objective consideration of the
larger issues, many open issues can be resolved.
An expanded administrative process could be led by GAO.
GAO can help ensure that the government remains in charge of those
functions that are crucial to our functioning as a civil society. Its role
as an objective decider and honest broker gives it enormous
credibility. There is also no substitute for the public's voice on these
matters, as expressed both through public-private competitors and a
broad range of interest groups. Should GAO's role expand,
congressional interest will be heightened. Congress must evaluate
what society is losing when the private-public distinction becomes
submerged by the privatization movement. At stake, of course, is the
degree of accountability and credibility necessary to make our
government and society work effectively.
386. See generally ROBERT WRIGHT, NON-ZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY
209-28 (2000) (describing how society progresses by cooperating, not competing).
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Privatization need not be the enemy here. Many functions of
government can be performed better and more effectively with
competitive sourcing. But the higher up the policy ladder the process
goes, the closer one gets to inappropriate outcomes. What is lost is
not just the job, but the credentials of the official involved. As Justice
Scalia noted in his Webster v. Doe dissent,387 government officials take
oaths of office to uphold the Constitution. But they also subscribe to
stringent conflict of interest and ethics rules,388 and work for more
than money.389  Oaths and badges are not merely symbols or
formalities. They accompany the defining qualities of authority and
credibility. In our post 9/11 world, government officials have earned
renewed respect from the public.39 ° The credibility of a public sector
employee is not easily transferred to the private sector.
The public's perceptions matter. The seafood inspector
program 391 and the airport security situation are two diverse examples
that make a larger point: the private sector often prefers to have
government officials in charge. The public is demanding of
government officials, but it is also respectful of them. Admittedly,
credibility is hard to measure and we are entitled to be skeptical
about it. Still, officials of government are not always bound by the
self-interested calculations of political markets. 39 The values behind
public service help animate the public-private distinction. When
private contractors perform inherent government functions, they
jeopardize core values of public law and weaken government's
capacity to do the common good.
The goal is to grant privatization its due while protecting public
sector values. Boundaries are admittedly hard to draw. But as the
trend toward privatizing government functions accelerates, locating
387. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see discussion
supra note 181 and accompanying text.
388. See JOHN A. ROHR, ETHICS FOR BUREAUCRATS: AN ESSAY ON LAW AND
VALUES 48 (2d ed. 1989) (connecting the political challenges of administration to ethical
principles).
389. The view of government officials as purely "budget maximizers" has been
challenged. See GOODSELL, supra note 111, at 100-06 (finding non-economic motivations
of government officials in addition to budget maximizing cases).
390. One need only consider the respect that flows to firefighters and police in New
York City after 9/11; these are now prestigious jobs, and the public respects those who
hold them. To see this confirmed, one needs only to count the number of "FDNY" or
"NYPD" caps on private heads.
391. See discussion supra Part V.B.1.
392. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Privatization and
Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1439-41 (2003) (describing the relevance of
"public choice" theory to public decisionmaking).
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them becomes an imperative exercise in public law and government
management. All three branches of government have a stake in
ensuring that this exercise succeeds.
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